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Butler: Venue Transfer When a Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction: Where a

VENUE TRANSFER WHEN A COURT LACKS
PERSONAL JURISDICTION: WHERE ARE
COURTS GOING WITH 28 U.S.C. § 1631?
I. INTRODUCTION
Courts use venue to balance the plaintiff’s choice of forum with
protections of fairness and convenience for defendants.1 Venue transfer
is one aspect of venue that Congress created to improve the efficient
change of courtrooms when either the public or the defendant demands
a more convenient forum.2 The original venue transfer provisions, 28
U.S.C § 1404(a)3 and 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a),4 are meant to be easy to follow,
but they have created complications when courts have used them to
transfer cases when they lack jurisdiction over the defendant. 5 As a
result, venue transfer lacks the certainty that lawyers typically rely on,
wastes judicial time, and wastes resources. 6 Courts have tried to use 28
See 17 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 110.01 (3d ed. 2004).
Venue statutes are concerned with convenience. Id. For example, § 1406(a) “was in
keeping with the general trend in legislative changes affecting federal court procedure ‘of
removing whatever obstacles may impede an expeditious and orderly adjudication of cases
and controversies.’” Id. § 111.31. Congress meant for § 1404(a) to have a broad remedial
purpose to prevent wasted time, energy, and money. Id. § 111.11. Further it protects
litigants, witnesses, and the public against inconvenience. Id.; see also David E. Steinberg,
The Motion to Transfer and the Interests of Justice, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 443, 452 (1990) (“The
section 1404 transfer assumes that the long-run efficiency gains resulting from the litigation
of a case in a more convenient forum will outweigh the immediate costs that accompany a
transfer.”).
2
“While there is no definitive list of factors that must be considered, courts typically
look to some or all . . . ’public’ ‘and private’ interest factors to determine whether the
proposed alternative forum would better serve the convenience and interest of justice
requirements.” MOORE ET AL., supra note 1, § 111.13.
3
See infra note 52 and accompanying text (providing the language of § 1404).
4
See infra note 69 and accompanying text (providing the language of § 1406).
5
See infra Part II.B (explaining how the function of § 1404(a) and § 1406(a) changed as
courts utilized them when a court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant).
6
See MOORE ET AL., supra note 1, § 111.02.
What sounds like a simple exercise in determining which of the two
statutes properly applies often can be complicated because, even
though venue is technically proper because it complies with the
applicable venue statute . . . some courts nonetheless define venue as
“wrong” if some other procedural obstacle in the original court, such
as lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendant, would have
prevented the action from proceeding there. In such a case, the courts
also disagree as to which of the two statutes properly applies to effect
transfer . . . . Thus, what should be a straightforward exercise in
determining which transfer statute applies, however, frequently is
complicated by the courts’ use of different standards to determine
when venue is “wrong.”
Id.
1
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U.S.C. § 1631 7 to solve these problems, but again, inconsistent court
opinions prevent the statute from making venue transfer efficient.8 The
result is that practicing attorneys have difficulty predicting the results
following a venue transfer.9 This phenomenon is best illustrated by the
following hypothetical.10
Imagine that Kate, a defense lawyer, represents an Iowa citizen and
Sally, a plaintiff lawyer, represents an Illinois citizen. Kate’s client was
served with a summons to an Illinois federal court one year and nine
months after the occurrence of a cause of action with a two-year statute
of limitations. Initially, Kate is not worried because she knows that
Illinois has no personal jurisdiction over her client, and hence, she will
easily be able to dispense of the claim. Kate first moves to quash service,
which the court grants. However, when Kate files a motion to dismiss
for lack of personal jurisdiction, Sally moves for a change of venue. Kate
is still not worried. She knows the only permissible forum is Iowa,
where the statute of limitations is two years, and she will still be able to
defeat the claim because two years have passed since the incident giving
rise to the complaint. By the time the action gets to Iowa and her client is
re-served as required by Iowa law, the appropriate statute of limitations
will have run.
However, Sally specifically asks the court to transfer under § 1631.
Sally asserts that § 1631 has superceded § 1404(a) and § 1406(a) in
transfers by a court that lacks jurisdiction over the defendant. Further,
she explains that § 1631 demands that the action be deemed filed in Iowa
on the day it was filed in the impermissible Illinois forum. Kate realizes
Courts have struggled with the application of the federal transfer of
venue statutes since their enactment in 1948. Simply worded and
widely invoked, these provisions have proved difficult to interpret less
for what they say than for what they omit. The resulting case law has,
in the words of one judge, produced a “nearly hopeless muddle of
conflicting reasoning and precedent.”
Robert Finzi, The 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) Transfer of Time-Barred Claims, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 975,
977 (1994). Mr. Finzi also asserts that more than 2,000 claims were transferred under
§ 1404(a) alone in 1982. Id. at 977 n.9.
7
See infra note 174 and accompanying text (setting out the language of § 1631).
8
See infra Parts II.C, III.B (explaining the inconsistent application of § 1631 and
discussing the effects of the inconsistent applications).
9
See infra Part II.B (discussing the scattered results of venue transfer when a court lacks
personal jurisdiction).
10
The following hypothetical is loosely based on the factual situation that occurred in
Mayo Clinic v. Kaiser, 383 F.2d 653 (8th Cir. 1967). However, the names, laws of the states,
and the lawsuit are purely fictional, and it is purely coincidental to the extent that such a
fact pattern does exist.
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that this transfer means the Iowa statute of limitations no longer bars
Sally’s claim. The court responds to Sally that § 1631 will not be used
because the court believes that § 1631 only works when a court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction. Instead, the court determines that the
transfer will take place under § 1406(a). Kate lets out a sigh of relief
because she knows that under § 1406(a) the new forum applies its own
state law when the case arrives. As a result, Sally will have to re-serve
Kate under Iowa law and her action will be barred by the Iowa statute of
limitations.
However, the court surprisingly determines that the Iowa court must
apply the longer Illinois statute of limitations of four years. Therefore,
Sally’s claim will not be barred by the statute of limitations. Kate cannot
believe the result and only wonders when and how a simple venue
transfer became so complicated and unfair.
This hypothetical represents the problems today with venue transfer
when a court lacks personal jurisdiction over a defendant.11 Not even
experienced attorneys can accurately predict what will happen with a
cause of action after a venue transfer has been requested when the court
lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 12 The purpose of this
Note is to advocate that § 1631 must be amended to (1) clearly establish
that it is the transfer provision to use when transferring to a different
venue due to a lack of personal or subject matter jurisdiction,13 and (2) it
must be amended to take into account fairness to defendants so that a
plaintiff’s claim is not preserved indefinitely. 14 Part II of this Note
focuses on the background of venue transfer. 15 Specifically, Part II
explains the purpose of venue transfer, 16 why and how its purpose
changed, 17 how that change created an inefficient system, 18 and how
11
See infra Part III (explaining the efficiency problems caused by venue transfer when a
court lacks jurisdiction).
12
See infra Parts II.B–C (discussing the scattered results that courts have reached in
applying venue transfer provisions, which has created a system with uncertain rules).
13
See infra Part IV (proposing an author-created amendment to § 1631 that will make
venue transfer efficient again).
14
See infra Part IV (proposing an author-created amendment to § 1631 to be more fair to
defendants).
15
See infra Part II (discussing the legal background of venue transfer, venue transfer
when a court lacks personal jurisdiction, and the application of § 1631).
16
See infra Part II.A (explaining the function and purpose of venue transfer from forum
non conveniens to the transfer provisions of § 1404(a) and § 1406(a)).
17
See infra Part II.B (discussing how the purpose and function of venue transfer changed
as a result of the Goldlawr decision).
18
See infra Part II (discussing § 1404(a), § 1406(a), forum non conveniens, and case law
applying § 1404(a) and § 1406(a) when a court lacks jurisdiction).
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courts tried to utilize § 1631 to restore efficiency to venue transfer. 19
Finally, Part II explores the different interpretations of § 1631.20 Part III
of this Note analyzes the problems with lack of personal jurisdiction
venue transfer, 21 the reasons that § 1631 was used in an attempt to
resolve those flaws,22 why § 1631 fails to resolve those flaws,23 and the
flaws of § 1631 itself.24 Part IV of this Note proposes amendments to
§ 1631 that will restore efficiency to venue transfer and alleviate the
problems with the statute itself. 25 Specifically, the amendment
incorporates language that clearly establishes § 1631 as the venue
transfer statute to use when a court transfers to a different venue because
it lacks personal jurisdiction over a defendant, which will conserve court
resources and provide a reliable, certain rule for lawyers to follow. 26
Additionally, the amendment strikes particular language that is
detrimental to defendants.27 Taken as a whole, the amended statute will
preserve valid plaintiff claims, account for fairness to the defendant, and
apply uniformly and efficiently.28
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND OF VENUE TRANSFER WITHOUT PERSONAL
JURISDICTION
This Part explains that if a court lacks personal jurisdiction over the
defendant, a venue transfer wastes judicial time and resources and also
creates uncertainty for lawyers.29 First, Part II.A explores the original
purpose and function of venue transfer beginning with forum non
19
See infra Part II.C.1 (presenting why the Ross court felt the need to utilize § 1631
because venue transfer had become so complicated and inconsistent).
20
See infra Part II.C (explaining some of the various applications, narrow and broad, of
§ 1631).
21
See infra Part III (outlining the problems with venue transfer when a court lacks
personal jurisdiction over the defendant).
22
See infra Part III.B (describing that § 1631 almost remedied the problems with venue
transfers when a court lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant).
23
See infra Parts III.B.1–3 (displaying the problems with § 1631 and setting the
groundwork for the amendment).
24
See infra Part III (analyzing the reasons that § 1631 needs to be amended to reclaim
efficiency with venue transfer).
25
See infra Part IV (providing the suggested amendments to § 1631 to resolve the
problems that venue transfers have caused when a court lacks personal jurisdiction).
26
See infra Part IV (explaining the need for such an amendment so that § 1631 will apply
uniformly and make venue transfer more efficient).
27
See infra Part IV (explaining the need for such an amendment because § 1631 takes
away defendant protections with choice of law, specifically the statute of limitations).
28
See infra Part V (providing a brief conclusion that details the reasons the proposed
amendments to § 1631 balance the interests involved with venue transfer).
29
See infra Part II (discussing the legal background of venue transfer provisions and
their application when a court lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant).
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conveniens and ending with the most common venue transfer provisions
of § 1404(a) and § 1406(a).30 Second, Part II.B explains that the function
of § 1404(a) and § 1406(a) changed when courts began to transfer cases in
which they lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendants.31 Part II.B
also discusses the reasons that venue transfer became inefficient as lack
of personal jurisdiction transfers intersected with choice of law doctrines
pertaining to § 1404(a) and § 1406(a).32 Finally, Part II.C explores why
courts began using § 1631 as well as the different interpretations of how
§ 1631 should function.33
A. Purpose and Function of Venue Transfer
The purpose of congressionally created venue34 rules is to promote
convenience and fairness for both the parties and the court.35 In terms of
30
See infra Part II.A (discussing the general transfer provisions § 1404(a) and § 1406(a)
and their ancestor, forum non conveniens).
31
See infra Part II.B (discussing the application of § 1404(a) and § 1406(a) after the
Goldlawr v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463 (1962), decision).
32
See infra Part II.C (showing that courts are split on whether to apply Goldlawr to
overcome choice of law obstacles as well).
33
See infra Part II.C (exploring the various applications of § 1631 in the post-Goldlawr
era).
34
Venue is defined as: “The proper or a possible place for the trial of a case.” BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 745 (2d Pocket ed. 2001).
35
Mitchell G. Page, Comment, After the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990: Does the General
Federal Venue Statute Survive as a Protection for Defendants?, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1153, 1160
(2003). The author asserts that both venue and personal jurisdiction are characterized as
protections for the defendant, and he notes a distinction between the purpose of personal
jurisdiction and venue. Id. at 1159–60. Personal jurisdiction is a guarantee that defendants
receive treatment in a manner consistent with the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 1158. Thus, personal jurisdiction is a question of whether a
court has power over a person. Id. at 1159. On the other hand, venue regulations do not
raise constitutional concerns and are only thought of as additional protections for the
defendant. Id. This particular comment argued that the International Shoe test for personal
jurisdiction, which provides that a defendant must have certain minimum contacts with a
state to avoid offending traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, only focuses
on the minimum contacts aspect of due process. Id. at 1159–60. The author noted that the
only time in the past sixty years that a court relied on the “fair play and substantial justice
inquiry” was in Asahi Metal Industrial Co. v. Superior Court. Id. at 1160; Asahi Metal Indus.
Co. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 113–16 (1987). Thus, the author concludes: “It is the venue
rules promulgated by Congress, and not the Due Process requirements of the Constitution,
that primarily take into account the issues of convenience and fairness.” Page, supra, at
1160; see also Jeffrey J. Kanne, Note, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens: History,
Application, and Acceptance in Iowa, 69 IOWA L. REV. 975, 980–81 (1984). This author
determined that a decision in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, dealing with forum non conveniens,
addressed the opposite interest of International Shoe v. Washington. Kanne, supra, at 980;
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947); Int’l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
International Shoe recognized that a state has an interest in adjudicating actions closely
connected to the state and expanded plaintiff rights by increasing the possible number of
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fairness, venue statutes protect defendants against the risk that plaintiffs
will select an unfair or inconvenient place for trial.36 The venue rules
also account for the public interest, which may demand that the trial take
place in a different forum. 37 Although venue provisions protect
defendants and the public, plaintiffs retain the privilege of choosing the
venue. 38 As a result, plaintiffs hold a distinct advantage with venue
because they determine both the location and the applicable law. 39
Congress passed venue transfer provisions, such as § 1404(a) and

forums. Kanne, supra, at 980–81. Meanwhile, Gulf Oil Corp. recognized that a state has an
interest in not adjudicating actions that are loosely connected to the state and expanded
defendants’ rights because it determined that a defendant’s right not to be burdened with
an inconvenient and unjust forum must be balanced with a plaintiff’s choice of forum. Id.
at 981.
36
Page, supra note 35, at 1161 (quoting the language from Leroy v. Great West United
Corp., “the purpose of statutory venue is to protect the defendant against the risk that a
plaintiff will select an unfair or inconvenient place of trial”).
37
Id. While venue protects both the defendant and the public, this Note specifically
focuses on the protection it offers to defendants; therefore, the protection it offers to the
public and how that has changed through the years is beyond the scope of this Note.
38
See Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29 (1955). The Supreme Court declared that a
court should consider the plaintiff’s choice of forum under a transfer. Id. at 29. District and
circuit courts further stated that unless a forum is extremely inconvenient for a defendant,
the plaintiff’s forum should rarely be disturbed. See Gen. Portland Cement Co. v. Perry,
204 F.2d 316 (7th Cir. 1953); Sun Oil Co. v. Lederle, 199 F.2d 423 (6th Cir. 1952); Ford Motor
Co. v. Ryan, 182 F.2d 329 (2d Cir. 1950); Bergeron v. Sabine Dredging & Constr. Co., 281 F.
Supp. 223 (D. La. 1968); Benrus Watch Co. v. Bulova Watch Co., 126 F. Supp. 470 (D.R.I.
1954); Sherman v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 122 F. Supp. 492 (D. Pa. 1954).
39
Robert A. Ragazzo, Transfer and Choice of Federal Law: The Appellate Model, 93 MICH. L.
REV. 703, 709–10 (1995). Professor Ragazzo argues that a plaintiff’s venue privilege is well
founded, and he points to Van Dusen v. Barrack, where the Supreme Court indicated that a
court should give great deference to a plaintiff’s choice of forum. Id.; see also Van Dusen,
376 U.S. 612, 628–31 (1964). Professor Ragazzo asserts that in the interest of efficiency and
saving resources, plaintiffs, instead of judges, are given wide latitude to determine the
initial forum. Ragazzo, supra, at 710. Also, allowing the plaintiff to select venue involves
fewer steps because the process would be much slower if the plaintiff had to communicate
with the defendant to determine the proper venue before the litigation process even
started. Id. Professor Ragazzo also asserts that defendants are protected by such concepts
as personal and subject matter jurisdiction, and venue should only be reconsidered in very
rare instances. Id. at 708–09. To do otherwise would undermine the goal of efficiency in
allowing plaintiffs to choose in the first place. Id. at 710. Still, Professor Ragazzo admits
that plaintiffs have an advantage with being able to choose the forum because they
essentially influence the choice of law. Id.
This Note discusses later how this advantage, although given credence, sometimes
becomes known as forum shopping, which courts tend to dislike. See infra note 74 and
accompanying text (discussing why courts are concerned with some instances of plaintiff
forum shopping).
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§ 1406(a), to promote efficiency with venue in the federal procedural
scheme. 40
The common law doctrine of forum non conveniens is the ancestor for
§ 1404(a) and § 1406(a). 41 Exploring forum non conveniens provides
deeper insight into the specific purpose behind venue transfer and the
reasons that Congress passed § 1404(a) and § 1406(a).42
1.

Forum Non Conveniens: The First Form of Venue Transfer

Prior to the existence of the federal transfer statutes, forum non
conveniens was the only protection defendants had against plaintiffs who
abused the venue provisions.43 Under forum non conveniens, a court can
dismiss a case despite the fact that venue and jurisdiction are proper
because a more convenient and proper forum exists for adjudication.44
The general venue statute is 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (2000). This statute states:
(a) a civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of
citizenship may, . . . be brought only in (1) a judicial district where any
defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same State, (2) a
judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions
giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that
is the subject of the action is situated, or (3) a judicial district in which
any defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action
is commenced, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise
be brought.
Id. Both § 1404(a) and § 1406(a) allow for transfer from one venue to another and are
arranged under title 28, which is the same title where the general venue provisions such as
§ 1391 are located, and so it appears that § 1404 and § 1406 are members of the venue
family. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (2000); 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2000); 28 U.S.C. § 1406 (2000).
41
See infra Part II.A.1 (discussing the history, background, and generalities of forum non
convienens).
42
Richard L. Marcus, Conflicts Among Circuits and Transfers Within the Federal Judicial
System, 93 YALE L.J. 677, 679–80 (1984). Professor Marcus notes that even though it requires
a court to dismiss an action, forum non conveniens is meant for situations in which a more
convenient forum exists. Id. Thus, in 1948, Congress provided § 1404(a) as an alternative
to forum non conveniens and dismissal, but it allowed for transfer to a court that was more
convenient so long as venue and personal jurisdiction were proper. Id. Thus, although it
included more than the common law doctrine of forum non conveniens, the driving premise
of § 1404(a) was to allow the case to be brought to a more convenient forum. Id.; see also
Annotation, Questions as to Convenience and Justice of Transfer Under Forum Non Conveniens
Provisions of Judicial Code (28 USC § 1404(a)), 1 A.L.R. FED. 15, 30 (1969) (“The forum non
conveniens provision of the Judicial Code of 1948, [is] in 28 USC § 1404(a).”).
43
Marcus, supra note 42, at 679. “Until 1948, transfer of cases among federal courts was
impossible. Dismissal on grounds of forum non conveniens was the only remedy for abuse
of venue provisions. In 1947 the Supreme Court confirmed the availability of such
dismissal as a matter of federal common law.” Id.
44
See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947) (superceded by 28 U.S.C. § 1404); see
also Kanne, supra note 35, at 980–82. In Gulf Oil Corp., the Supreme Court endorsed the
doctrine and determined that a court could decline jurisdiction and dismiss an action in a
40
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The doctrine presupposes that another forum exists where personal
jurisdiction and venue are proper for the case to be adjudicated.45 Courts
still give the plaintiff’s original choice of forum great deference, but
forum non conveniens gives defendants the opportunity to acquire a better
forum if the original forum is unreasonable.46
However, federal courts encountered problems when they applied
forum non conveniens. 47 For example, forum non conveniens could not

forum that was proper if a more proper forum existed, but only if jurisdiction and venue
were initially proper. 330 U.S. at 504 (“This Court, in one form of words or another, has
repeatedly recognized the existence of the power to decline jurisdiction in exceptional
circumstances.”).
45
Gulf Oil Corp., 330 U.S. at 506–07 (“In all cases in which the doctrine of forum non
conveniens comes into play, it presupposes at least two forums in which the defendant is
amenable to process.”).
46
For a particularly good summary of aspects a court considers under this doctrine, see
Kanne, supra note 35, at 982–83. However, the Court in Gulf Oil Corp. specifically stated
some considerations and factors that would make a plaintiff’s choice unreasonable. 330
U.S. at 508.
If the combination and weight of factors requisite to given results are
difficult to forecast or state, those to be considered are not difficult to
name. An interest to be considered, and the one likely to be most
pressed, is the private interest of the litigant. Important considerations
are the relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of
compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of
obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of
premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all other
practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and
inexpensive. There may also be questions as to the enforceability of a
judgment if one is obtained. The court will weigh relative advantages
and obstacles to fair trial. It is often said that the plaintiff may not, by
choice of an inconvenient forum, “vex,” “harass,” or “oppress” the
defendant by inflicting upon him expense or trouble not necessary to
his own right to pursue his remedy. . . . Factors of public interest also
have place in applying the doctrine. Administrative difficulties follow
for courts when litigation is piled up in congested centers instead of
being handled at its origin. Jury duty is a burden that ought not be
imposed upon the people of a community which has no relation to the
litigation. In cases which touch the affairs of many persons, there is
reason for holding the trial in their view and reach rather than in
remote parts of the country where they can learn of it by report only.
There is a local interest in having localized controversies decided at
home. There is an appropriateness, too, in having the trial of a
diversity case in a forum that is at home with the state law that must
govern the case, rather than having a court in some other forum
untangle problems in conflict of laws, and in law foreign to itself.
Id. at 508–09.
47
See Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44 (1941); Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 58
(1949).
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apply in some controversies because of certain federal law restrictions.48
As a result, sometimes a defendant would have to defend himself in an
expensive and inconvenient forum, even when the necessary resources
existed in an alternative forum.49 Also, the doctrine could be especially
harsh and inconvenient to plaintiffs because courts had to dismiss the
case, which forced plaintiffs to re-file in a new forum.50 These problems
spurred Congress to pass laws that promoted efficient change to a new
courtroom.51

48
See, e.g., Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 314 U.S. at 52. In Baltimore & Ohio R.R., respondent
Kepner originally filed his Federal Employer Liability Act claim in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York under a special venue provision within
that Act that allowed the respondent to file a claim either where defendant resided or
where he did a substantial amount of business. Id. at 48–49. Petitioner, an interstate
railroad, tried to enjoin the respondent in a state court in Ohio, claiming that suitable local
courts, both state and federal, existed besides the one where the respondent filed his claim,
which was over seven hundred miles from most of the witnesses and evidence. Id. The
petitioner claimed that the huge cost it would take to defend the suit in the New York
District Court was of no benefit to the respondent and that the respondent actually filed the
case in New York to haggle and vex the petitioner. Id. at 51–52. The Supreme Court found
that the supremacy clause prevented the Ohio state court from enjoining Kepner’s action
because it was based on a matter of federal law. Id. at 52. Hence, the state could not stop
Kepner’s New York action. Id. The doctrine of forum non conveniens was inapplicable
because the Federal Employers’ Liability Act only allowed Kepner to bring his action in
New York, where the defendant was an inhabitant. Id. at 51. Because forum non conveniens
would have caused dismissal of Kepner’s claim, Kepner would have had to re-file. Id. His
action essentially would have been barred because the Federal Employer’ Liability Act
prevented him from bringing a new Ohio action. Id. at 50–53. Therefore, this complex
situation demonstrated the need for a transfer provision rather than forum non conveniens.
Id.; see also Gulf Oil Corp., 330 U.S. at 505; Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. at 58.
49
See Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. at 48, for an example of a defendant
being forced to defend in an inconvenient forum:
It was stated the federal court chosen was seven hundred miles from
the residence of the respondent and numerous witnesses; that to
present the case properly required the personal attendance of
approximately twenty-five locally available witnesses . . . at a cost
estimated to exceed the cost of the presentation of the case . . . with no
resulting benefit to the injured employee.
Id. However, due to the lack of a venue transfer provision, the defendant in Baltimore &
Ohio R.R. was forced to defend in such a forum. Id. at 52–53.
50
See Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29 (1955). The Supreme Court indicated that
Congress did more than simply codify forum non conveniens. Id. at 32. The Court indicated
that § 1404(a) replaced the harshest result of forum non conveniens, dismissal, with transfer.
Id.; see, e.g., All States Freight, Inc. v. Modarelli, 196 F.2d 1010, 1011 (3d Cir. 1952)
(indicating that forum non conveniens is much different from § 1404(a) because forum non
conveniens finds the action to be so inappropriate and inconvenient that it is best to stop the
litigation and let it begin elsewhere).
51
See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2000); see also Ex parte Collette, 337 U.S. at 57. The Supreme
Court specifically quoted the reviser’s notes that went along with § 1404(a):
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Section 1404(a)

One law Congress passed was § 1404(a).52 Section 1404(a) accounts
for defendants, preserves legitimate plaintiff claims, and promotes
efficiency.53 Section 1404(a) operates like forum non conveniens because it
allows for a venue change if the original forum is unreasonable, and it
presupposes that two legitimate forums exist where both personal
jurisdiction and venue are proper.54 Further, the Supreme Court has
Subsection (a) was drafted in accordance with the doctrine of forum
non conveniens, permitting transfer to a more convenient forum, even
though the venue is proper. As an example of the need of such a
provision, see Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. . . . . The new subsection requires
the court to determine that the transfer is necessary for convenience of
the parties and witnesses, and further, that it is in the interest of justice
to do so.
Ex parte Collette, 337 U.S. at 58.
To relieve against what was apparently thought to be the harshness of
dismissal, under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, of an action
brought in an inconvenient one of two or more legally available
forums, . . . and concerned by the reach of Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v.
Kepner, 314 U.S. 44, . . . Congress, in 1948, enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335–36 (1960).
52
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). “For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of
justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it
might have been brought.” Id. The remainder of § 1404, which is not within the scope of
this Note, is as follows:
(b) Upon motion, consent or stipulation of all parties, any action, suit
or proceeding of a civil nature or any motion or hearing thereof, may
be transferred, in the discretion of the court, from the division in which
pending to any other division in the same district. Transfer of
proceedings in rem brought by or on behalf of the United States may
be transferred under this section without the consent of the United
States where all other parties request transfer.
(c) A district court may order any civil action to be tried at any place
within the division in which it is pending.
(d) As used in this section, the term “district court” includes the
District of Guam, the District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands,
and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, and the term “district”
includes the territorial jurisdiction of each such court.
Id. § 1404(b)–(d).
53
See MOORE ET AL., supra note 1, § 111.11.
Recognizing that the “broad venue provisions in federal Acts often
resulted in inconvenient forums,” Congress intended Section 1404(a) to
remedy this situation by authorizing easy transfer of actions to a more
convenient federal forum. It has a broad remedial purpose: “to
prevent the waste ‘of time, energy and money’ and ‘to protect
litigants.’”
Id.
54
See supra note 45 and accompanying text (stating forum non conveniens presumes two
permissible forums); see also Hoffman, 363 U.S. 335. The Supreme Court determined that the

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol40/iss3/9

Butler: Venue Transfer When a Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction: Where a

2006]

Where are Courts Going with § 1631

799

determined that § 1404(a) applies to all federal civil actions.55 As a result,
§ 1404(a) even applies to those actions where forum non conveniens could
not be used, and thus, it solves the problems of forum non conveniens
because it applies uniformly to all federal actions. 56 However, the
biggest improvement over forum non conveniens is that § 1404(a) does not
dismiss a case like forum non conveniens.57 Instead, it simply transfers the
case to a new court, which preserves valid plaintiff claims because the
case does not have to be re-filed.58 Thus, § 1404(a) is a more efficient
codification of forum non conveniens because it applies uniformly and
does not result in dismissal.59

“might have been brought” language in § 1404(a) meant that the case could only be
transferred to a forum where the plaintiff could have brought the action at the time that he
filed suit. Hoffman, 363 U.S. at 344. The dispute originated because the defendant wanted
to transfer the action to a district court in Illinois from the district court in Texas. Id. at 336.
Even though the court was an improper venue and lacked jurisdiction in that forum, the
trial court granted the motion to transfer “for the convenience of the parties and witnesses
in the interest of justice” because the defendant had waived both the personal jurisdiction
and venue requirement by requesting the transfer. Id. at 337. Restricting § 1404(a) to its
precise language, the Supreme Court ruled that the transfer was not proper because the
action could not originally have been brought in the Illinois district court, even though the
defendant waived his right to challenge venue and personal jurisdiction after the fact. Id. at
343.
55
Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. at 58. The Supreme Court interpreted the words “civil action”
to mean all civil actions. Id. “The reviser’s notes make clear that the phrase was
substituted for ‘suit,’ formerly used in various venue statutes, in the light of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure, rule 2, 28 U.S.C.A: There shall be one form of action to be known as ‘civil
action.’” Id. at 58 n.6.
56
Id. at 59. This interpretation resolved the problem forum non conveniens encountered in
Baltimore & Ohio R.R., in that § 1404(a) did not apply to only some federal laws like forum
non conveniens, but rather, it applied to all federal laws. See supra Part II.A.1 (describing the
problems with forum non conveniens). The Supreme Court has also asserted that the
relevant factors a court was to look at under forum non conveniens for the plaintiff’s choice
of forum were not to be considered. Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 32 (1955). The
Court indicated that a transfer could take place under § 1404(a) with a lesser showing of
inconvenience than forum non conveniens. Id.; cf. Rogers v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 219 F.
Supp. 598, 600 (W.D. Pa. 1963) (denying the plaintiff’s contention that a transfer under
§ 1404(a) required a clear and compelling reason for transfer because § 1404(a) was a
revision of forum non conveniens and required only a lesser showing of convenience).
57
See Norwood, 349 U.S. at 32; All States Freight, Inc. v. Modarelli, 196 F.2d 1010, 1011 (3d
Cir. 1952). The Supreme Court indicated that § 1404(a) was not meant to be a mere
codification of forum non conveniens; rather, it was meant to be a revision. Norwood, 349 U.S.
at 32. As proof, the Court looked to the fact that the harshest part of the doctrine,
dismissal, was replaced. Id.
58
See supra notes 54–56 and accompanying text (indicating how the Court interpreted
that § 1404(a) resolved the problems caused by forum non conveniens: dismissal and
inapplicability to all federal statutes).
59
See supra note 56 and accompanying text (describing § 1404(a) as an improvement
over forum non conveniens because it allowed an easier transfer).
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However, § 1404(a) conflicts with the Erie Doctrine 60 because it
inevitably involves two different state forums with different state laws.61
See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Scott Fruehwald, Choice of Law in Federal
Courts: A Reevaluation, 37 BRANDEIS L.J. 21 (Fall 1998–1999). Erie overturned the earlier
Supreme Court decision of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842), which allowed a federal court to
ignore a state’s common law and apply its own independent judgment of what the law
should be. 304 U.S. at 90. Erie stated, among other things, that this interpretation was
improper because it prevented uniformity of the law throughout the state even though it
attempted to promote uniformity in the federal court system. Id. at 91. Therefore, Erie
determined that federal courts had to utilize state common law from the state in which it
was located in diversity cases. Id.
In developing the Erie doctrine, the Supreme Court has focused on distinguishing
between substance and procedure. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. New York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945);
17A JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 124.01 (3d ed. 2004)
[hereinafter 17A MOORE ET AL.]. In Guaranty Trust Co., the Court noted that the difference
between substance and procedure depends on the context in which the question arises
because a rule of law may be procedural for one purpose and substantive for another. 326
U.S. at 108–12. Thus, Guaranty Trust Co. defined substantive as something that would
“significantly affect the result of a litigation for a federal court to disregard [the law].” Id.
at 109. This principle became known as the “outcome determinative” test. Id.
This standard was developed more in later cases. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460
(1965); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958). In Byrd, the Court
developed a test for balancing competing state and federal laws by using outcome as only
one factor. See 17A MOORE ET AL., supra, § 124.06. The Byrd analysis recognizes three
elements: “(1) the state’s interest in having federal courts recognize and uphold its
substantive rules and policies, (2) the federal court’s interests in adhering to significant
federal principles in the administration of justice, and (3) the litigants’ interests in having
[a] uniform outcomes regardless of where the plaintiff sues.” Id. Although it is difficult to
apply, the Byrd test is still applicable in cases that do not involve federal rules. See
Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 516 U.S. 415 (1996).
Hanna provided federal courts with a guide to determine whether to apply the state or
federal law under the Rules Enabling Act, which “provides that the Supreme Court has
power to prescribe, by general rules, the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions,
and the practice and procedure of the United States district courts in civil actions.” See 17A
MOORE ET AL., supra, § 124.04. The Hanna test requires courts to ask whether “1) the scope
of the rule is ‘sufficiently broad to cover the situation’; and 2) the rule is (a) constitutional
and (b) a valid exercise of the Supreme Court’s rule-making power under the federal Rules
Enabling Act.” Id. § 124.02. If the scope of the federal rule is too broad for the Rules
Enabling Act to apply, the court must look to other standards that the Supreme Court has
developed, such as the Byrd test. Id.
The Supreme Court determined later which law to apply between states in a given
case. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). Choice of law is defined
as “the question of which jurisdiction’s law should apply in a given case.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 258 (8th ed. 2004). After Erie, Klaxon determined that a federal court must
apply the choice of law rules of the state in which the federal court is located in diversity
suits rather than applying the state law where most of the incident at issue took place.
Fruehwald, supra, at 26. The rationale behind this decision was to promote uniformity
within a state; otherwise diversity of citizenship would result in different laws being
applied between a federal court and a state court that were located in close proximity to
each other. Id.
61
See Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
60
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The Court determined how the Erie doctrine applies with § 1404(a) in
Van Dusen v. Barrack.62 In Van Dusen, the Supreme Court held that when
a defendant moves for change of venue under § 1404(a), the state law of
the court where the action was brought, the transferor court, applies. 63
The Court later found, in Ferens v. John Deere Co.,64 that even if a plaintiff
initiates the transfer, the state law of the transferor court applies.65 In
sum, § 1404(a) applies when venue is initially proper in any civil action,

[I]n our opinion the underlying and fundamental question is whether
. . . a change of venue within the federal system is to be accompanied
by a change in the applicable state law. Whenever the law of the
transferee State significantly differs from that of the transferor state . . .
it becomes necessary to consider what bearing a change of venue, if
accompanied by a change in state law, would have on “the interest of
justice.”
Id. at 625–26.
62
Id. at 636–37. In Van Dusen, the respondents were representatives of approximately
forty Pennsylvania decedents who instituted an action for wrongful deaths in a
Pennsylvania district court based on a plane crash in Boston, Massachusetts. Id. at 613–14.
More than one hundred total actions had been instituted against the array of defendants
including the airline, various manufacturers, the United States, and even the Massachusetts
Port Authority. Id. The petitioners moved to transfer the Pennsylvania action to a district
court in Massachusetts under § 1404(a). Id. at 614. The Pennsylvania district court granted
the transfer and determined that the law of Pennsylvania would apply in the
Massachusetts district court. Id. The respondents then sought a writ of mandamus from
the court of appeals and successfully contended that the district court erred in allowing the
transfer. Id. The court of appeals found that the § 1404(a) transfer could only be granted if
the respondents had been able to sue in Massachusetts at the time the suit was brought. Id.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari. Id. at 615.
63
Id. at 639.
We believe, therefore, that both the history and purposes of § 1404(a)
indicate that it should be regarded as a federal judicial housekeeping
measure, dealing with the placement of litigation in the federal courts
and generally intended, on the basis of convenience and fairness,
simply to authorize a change of courtrooms. . . . We conclude,
therefore, . . . where the defendants seek transfer, the transferee district
court must be obligated to apply the state law that would have been
applied if there had been no change of venue. A change of venue under
§ 1404(a) generally should be, with respect to state law, but a change of
courtrooms.
Id. at 636–37, 639 (emphasis added).
64
494 U.S. 516 (1990).
65
Id. The Supreme Court determined that the transferor court law should apply
pursuant to a plaintiff initiated transfer under § 1404(a). Id. Therefore, sound reason
suggests decisions such as that in United States v. Berkowitz, 328 F.2d 358 (3d Cir. 1964),
would be compelled to apply the transferor law as outlined from Ferens in transfers where
a court lacks personal jurisdiction and transfers under § 1404(a). See infra Part II.B
(discussing the problem with choice of law following transfers where a court lacked
jurisdiction).
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and a court is to utilize the state law of the transferor court following the
transfer.66
Despite the improvement that § 1404(a) provided over forum non
conveniens, it was not the only law that Congress passed.67 The other
venue transfer provision, § 1406(a), is more enigmatic, but Congress
apparently enacted it to improve efficiency of venue transfer as well. 68
3.

Section 1406(a)

Unlike both § 1404(a) and forum non conveniens, which are used
generally when venue is proper, § 1406(a)69 allows transfers to a proper
federal forum from a court where venue is initially improper.70 Under
§ 1406(a), the transfer must be to a court where the action could have
been brought, which requires both proper jurisdiction and proper
venue. 71 It also requires a law other than § 1404(a) to apply after a
See supra Part II.A.2 (providing that § 1404(a) has commonly been accepted to work).
See 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). Section 1406(a) allows a transfer of venue when it is initially
found to be improper, as long as it is “in the interest of justice.” 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).
68
See infra Part II.A.3 (indicating that the lack of legislative history and apparent
codification of forum non conveniens in § 1404(a) suggest that § 1406(a) did not have a
purpose).
69
“The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong
division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any
district or division in which it could have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (2000). The
remainder of § 1406, which is not within the scope of this Note follows:
(b) Nothing in this chapter [28 U.S.C.S. §§ 1391 et seq.] shall impair the
jurisdiction of a district court of any matter involving a party who does
not interpose timely and sufficient objection to the venue.
(c) As used in this section, the term “district court” includes the
District Court of Guam, the District Court for the Northern Mariana
Islands, and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, and the term
“district” includes the territorial jurisdiction of each such court.
Id. § 1406(b)–(c).
70
See Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 634; see also Nelson v. Int’l Paint Co., 716 F.2d 640, 643 (9th
Cir. 1983); Woodward Park Imaging, Inc. v. Iwamoto, 955 F. Supp. 1006, 1008 (N.D. Ill.
1997); Skilling v. Funk Aircraft Co., 173 F. Supp. 939, 941–42 (W.D. Mo. 1959); cf. Clayton v.
Swift & Co., 132 F. Supp. 154, 158 (D. Va. 1955) (holding that a transfer could be made
under § 1406(a) if it was doubtful venue was proper without actually determining if it was
improper). See generally Schiller v. Mit-Clip Co., 180 F.2d 654 (2d Cir. 1950) (indicating that
a transfer under § 1406(a) does not depend upon the inconvenience of trying the action
where it was brought but simply that venue was improper).
71
See Orion Shipping & Trading Co. v. United States, 247 F.2d 755, 757 (9th Cir. 1957)
(remanding the case but suggesting that it be transferred to a district with proper venue);
French Transit v. Modern Coupon Sys., 858 F. Supp. 22, 28 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that a
case should be transferred to a district where it could have been brought); Zumft v. Doney
Slate Co., 698 F. Supp. 444, 446–47 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (determining that a case would be
transferred to a venue that was proper and had jurisdiction over the defendants).
66
67
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transfer. 72 Van Dusen did not address what state law should apply
following a § 1406(a) transfer, but most courts have stated that a court
should apply the state law of the state to which the case is transferred, or
the transferee law, instead of the state law of the transferor court.73 If the
state law of the transferor court followed a plaintiff from the transferor
forum to the transferee forum, the result would be the epitome of forum
shopping because the action was not technically allowed to be in the
transferor court in the first place. 74 Such a result would encourage
plaintiffs to file claims in any state that had beneficial law, regardless of
whether venue was proper, simply to capture that state law after the
transfer.75 Hence, most courts have settled on applying the law of the
transferee court to avoid this result.76 Therefore, § 1406(a) applies when
venue is improper and the transferee court should apply the state law of
the state in which it sits.77
Besides the function of § 1406(a), however, the purpose of § 1406(a)
is not entirely clear.78 Prior to the enactment of § 1406(a), only dismissal

72
See Ellis v. Great Sw. Corp., 646 F.2d 1099, 1109–10 (5th Cir. 1981); Martin v. Stokes,
623 F.2d 469, 473 (6th Cir. 1980).
73
See Ellis, 646 F.2d at 1109–10; Martin, 623 F.2d at 473; Tillman v. Eattock, 385 F. Supp.
625, 627 (D. Kan. 1974). Compare Bealle v. Nyden’s, Inc., 245 F. Supp. 86, 88–89 (D. Conn.
1965) (transferring a case to district court where the state statute of limitations had run and
allowing the state law to apply resulting in the case’s dismissal), with Viaggio v. Field, 177
F. Supp. 643, 648 (D. Md. 1959) (disallowing a transfer because the state statute of
limitations of the transferee court had run and rendering it a waste of time to transfer
simply to dismiss the action). But see Mayo Clinic v. Kaiser, 383 F.2d 653 (8th Cir. 1966)
(applying the transferor court law following a § 1406(a) transfer).
74
Ellis, 646 F.2d at 1109. There are three main types of forum shopping: shopping for
location, law of the case shopping, and shopping for choice of law. Stowell R.R. Kelner,
Note, “Adrift on an Uncharted Sea,” A Survey of Section 1404(a) Transfer in the Federal System,
67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 612, 634 (1992). Courts have primarily been concerned with the third type
of forum shopping, or trying to capture favorable law with § 1406(a), because it would be
unfair for the defendant to be subject to the state law where adjudication could not take
place. See Nelson, 716 F.2d at 643; Ellis, 646 F.2d at 1110–11; Parahm v. Edwards, 346 F.
Supp. 968, 973 (D. Ga. 1972).
75
See Nelson, 716 F.2d at 643; Ellis, 646 F.2d at 1110–11; Parahm, 346 F. Supp. at 973; see
also 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). The word “may” was purposely put into the statute to allow
discretion to consider whether plaintiffs were forum shopping and determine to either
dismiss the case or transfer it. Skilling, 173 F. Supp. at 942.
76
See supra note 73 and accompanying text (displaying support for courts that have
determined the law of the transferee state should apply after a § 1406(a) transfer).
77
See supra notes 69–75 and accompanying text (explaining the function of § 1406(a)).
78
Finzi, supra note 6, at 979 n.22. Mr. Finzi expresses that the primary reason that the
purpose of § 1406(a) is unknown is mainly because the legislative history of § 1406(a) does
not state a purpose for the statute. Id. Instead, most of the purpose for § 1406(a), including
its extensive protection of plaintiffs, stems from case law. Id. at 984.
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was available when venue was improper. 79 Apparently, Congress
passed § 1406(a) to alleviate these rare instances because dismissal was
harsh and sometimes caused unjust results.80 Some courts have stated
that the purpose of § 1406(a) is to remove any obstacles, such as judicial
technicalities and time constraints, that obstruct efficient adjudication.81
In Goldlawr v. Heiman, 82 the Supreme Court utilized similar analysis
when it determined that a case could be transferred under § 1406(a)
when a court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 83 The
Goldlawr decision was the first major case that defined the purpose of
§ 1406(a), but it had direct ramifications upon the function of not only
§ 1406(a) but also upon § 1404(a).84
B. Venue Transfer When a Court Lacks Jurisdiction
Sections 1404(a) and 1406(a) had distinct applications and were
passed to make specific instances of courtroom change easier and more

79
See MOORE ET AL., supra note 1, § 111.31. “Prior to the enactment of Section 1406(a), if
the plaintiff lay venue in the wrong district, the district court’s sole option was to dismiss
the action. Although the dismissal was without prejudice, it . . . often had the harsh result
of divesting the plaintiff of his . . . cause of action.” Id.
80
Id. § 111.02.
Prior to the enactment of Section 1406(a), if the plaintiff filed an action
in an improper venue, the defendant could make a motion to dismiss
for improper venue under Rule 12(b)(3). The only option available to
the district court, if the defendant’s argument proved correct, was to
dismiss the claims against the defendant. Unless the dismissed
defendant was a party who had to be joined under Rule 19(b), if the
plaintiff had filed claims against other defendants, the action would
continue on as to those defendants and the plaintiff would be forced to
file another action against the dismissed defendant. This obviously
inefficient result is cured by Section 1406(a).
Id.
81
See Aguacate Consol. Mines, Inc. v. Deeprock, Inc., 566 F.2d 523, 524 (5th Cir. 1978)
(stating that the purpose of § 1406 is “to remove obstacles that impede expeditious and
orderly adjudication”); see also Fuente v. ICC, 451 F. Supp. 867, 872 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (stating
that § 1406(a) “was designed to avoid the ‘time consuming and justice defeating
technicalities’ to which dismissal for improper venue necessarily gives rise”).
82
369 U.S. 463 (1962).
83
See infra Part II.B.1 (explaining how Goldlawr defined the purpose of § 1406(a) and
expanding its use to trump personal jurisdiction); see also Goldlawr v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463
(1962); Mayo Clinic v. Kaiser, 383 F.2d 653 (8th Cir. 1967); Dubin v. United States, 380 F.2d
813 (5th Cir. 1967).
84
See infra Parts II.B, III (explaining how courts split in the application of Goldlawr to
§ 1404(a) and how this had direct ramifications on which choice of law to apply and
ultimately led courts to use § 1631).
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efficient.85 However, when courts used the statutes to transfer a case
when a court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant, 86 the
distinction between the two began to dissipate. 87 Goldlawr determined
that the purpose of venue transfer was to remove all obstacles that kept a
court from adjudicating a claim, and consequently, the Goldlawr court
determined that when both venue was improper and a court lacked
85
See supra Parts II.A.2–3 (discussing that § 1404(a) is meant for transfers to a
permissible forum from a permissible forum and that § 1406(a) is meant for transfers to a
permissible forum from an impermissible forum).
86
Initially, although the Supreme Court has never spoke on the matter, lower courts
found that without subject matter jurisdiction, a court could not transfer a case. See
Grubisic v. Esperdy, 229 F. Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). One federal court stated that a lack
of subject matter renders the court powerless to grant any relief and that no statutory
authority could be exercised without such jurisdiction. Id. at 680. However, this finding
was differentiated from instances, like Goldlawr, where a court lacked personal jurisdiction.
369 U.S. at 463.
87
Personal jurisdiction refers to a court’s power to bring an individual within its
adjudicative process. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 384 (2d Pocket ed. 2001). The idea was
first exemplified in the landmark Supreme Court case Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1887).
Personal jurisdiction was further elaborated in later cases and involves a complex process
in itself. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). However,
the underlying principle is that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
limits the power of a state court to render personal judgments valid against a defendant
when the court lacks personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S.
at 294 (“[T]he Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate federalism, may
sometimes act to divest the State of its power to render a valid judgment.”); Hanson, 357
U.S. at 250 (holding that a state is forbidden to enter judgment attempting to bind a person
over whom it has no jurisdiction); Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 319 (“Whether due process is
satisfied . . . [d]oes not contemplate that a state may make a binding judgment in personam
against an individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no contacts.”).
Pennoyer laid the groundwork for the concept of personal jurisdiction. 95 U.S. at 732. In
Pennoyer, the Court held that the validity of court judgments could be questioned and
resisted and does not constitute due process of law when a court lacks jurisdiction. Id. at
732–33.
Whatever difficulty may be experienced in giving to those terms a
definition which will embrace every permissible exertion of power
affecting private rights, and exclude such as is forbidden, there can be
no doubt of their meaning when applied to judicial proceedings. They
then mean a course of legal proceedings according to those rules and
principles which have been established in our systems of
jurisprudence for the protection and enforcement of private rights.
Id. at 733. Other courts would build upon this ideal. For instance, in World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp., the Court reiterated that judgments rendered in violation of due process
were void and not entitled to full faith and credit. 444 U.S. at 291. Further, due process
does not allow a state to make a binding judgment against individuals when that state
lacks personal jurisdiction over them. Id. at 294. Thus, the common idea has stood strong
through the years that a court may not render judgments over a person when that court
lacks personal jurisdiction and should dismiss the case. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444
U.S. 286; Hanson, 357 U.S. 235; Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. 310.
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personal jurisdiction over the defendant, § 1406(a) was broad enough to
allow the transfer. 88 However, when the circuit courts attempted to
apply this rule to instances where a court was a proper venue but lacked
personal jurisdiction over the defendant, the courts split on whether to
utilize § 1404(a) or § 1406(a). 89 This split, in turn, was immensely
significant because whether a court used § 1404(a) or § 1406(a) affected
which choice of law would apply following the transfer.90 As a result,
many interpretations emerged as to what choice of law to apply, courts
expended unneeded time and resources in making such interpretations,
and uncertainty existed regarding the exact function of both § 1404(a)
and § 1406(a).91 One court aptly labeled the problem as “a merry chase
through the murky area in which the Erie doctrine and the federal
change of venue statutes intersect.”92 Goldlawr was the beginning.93
1.

The Beginning of Venue Transfer Without Jurisdiction

In Goldlawr, the United States Supreme Court used language that
suggested courts should strongly attempt to preserve a plaintiff’s claim
with a venue transfer due to a court’s lack of personal jurisdiction over
the defendant.94 The main issue in Goldlawr was whether to transfer or
See 369 U.S. at 466–67 (“The section is thus in accord with the general purpose which
has prompted many of the procedural changes of the past few years—that of removing
whatever obstacles may impede an expeditious and orderly adjudication of cases and
controversies on their merits.”).
89
See infra Part II.B.2 (showing the difficulty courts had in transferring venue when
venue was proper but the court lacked jurisdiction, which resulted in a circuit split in
whether to use § 1404(a) or § 1406(a)).
90
See infra Parts II.A.2–3 (explaining how courts are supposed to apply the state law of
the transferor court with § 1404(a) and the state law of the transferee court with § 1406(a)).
91
The first rule of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure suggests that uniformity and
efficiency should be a strong consideration in procedure with federal courts: “These rules
govern the procedure in the United States district courts . . . they shall be construed and
administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.”
FED. R. CIV. P. 1; see also Michael D. Bayles, On Legal Reform: Legal Stability and Legislative
Questions, 65 KY. L.J. 631, 637 (1977). “Five important considerations support the principle
of stability: The need for certainty; fairness to those who have relied upon the extant rule; the
efficiency of following precedent; the need for continuity in the law; and equality in treating
similar cases similarly.” Id. (emphasis added).
92
Ellis v. Great Sw. Corp., 646 F.2d 1099, 1100–01 (5th Cir. 1981).
93
See infra Part II.B.1 (showing how Goldlawr provided analysis that would be used by
courts later to split on whether to transfer under § 1404(a) when venue was proper but a
court lacked personal jurisdiction).
94
Goldlawr v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 466 (1962). The Court stated:
The problem which gave rise to the enactment of the section was that
of avoiding the injustice which had often resulted to plaintiffs from
dismissal of their actions merely because they had made an erroneous
guess with regard to the existence of some elusive fact of the kind
88
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dismiss an action when a court lacked personal jurisdiction over the
defendant and when a court was also an improper venue.95 The Goldlawr
Court held that a federal district court could transfer a case under
§ 1406(a) if venue was improper, even if that court lacked personal
jurisdiction over the defendant.96 According to the Court, § 1406(a) was
amply broad to allow transfers when a court lacked personal
jurisdiction, so long as it was “in the interests of justice.”97 The Goldlawr
Court was particularly concerned with the injustice that would occur if
plaintiffs’ actions were dismissed simply because they had made a
mistake with venue or personal jurisdiction, and it further stated: “The
section is thus in accord with the general purpose . . . that of removing
whatever obstacles may impede an expeditious and orderly adjudication
of cases and controversies on their merits.”98 Goldlawr did not determine
upon which venue provisions often turn. Indeed, this case is itself a
typical example of the problem sought to be avoided, for dismissal
here would have resulted in plaintiff’s losing a substantial part of its
cause of action under the statute of limitations merely because it made
a mistake in thinking that the respondent corporations could be
“found” or that they “transact . . . business” in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania. . . . The language of § 1406 (a) is amply broad enough to
authorize the transfer of cases, however wrong the plaintiff may have
been in filing his case as to venue, whether the court in which it was
filed had personal jurisdiction over the defendants or not. The section
is thus in accord with the general purpose which has prompted many
of the procedural changes of the past few years—that of removing
whatever obstacles may impede an expeditious and orderly
adjudication of cases and controversies on their merits.
Id. at 466–67.
95
Id. at 464. The case originally was filed in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania based on an antitrust action in accordance with the
Sherman and Clayton Acts. Id. The district court found that venue was improper as to two
of the defendants and that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction, and it then
transferred the action to the Southern District of New York pursuant to § 1406(a), which is
a court that had both personal jurisdiction over the two defendants in question and was a
proper venue. Id. The defendants then appeared in the New York district court and
motioned to dismiss the case under the theory that the original district court in
Pennsylvania lacked personal jurisdiction over them and thus lacked the power to transfer
the case. Id. at 464–65. The New York court granted this motion, the Second Circuit
affirmed, and the case then went to the Supreme Court. Id. at 465.
96
Id. at 466 (finding the language of § 1406(a) amply broad to allow such a transfer).
97
Id. at 465 (“Nothing in that language indicates that the operation of the section was
intended to be limited to actions in which the transferring court has personal jurisdiction
over the defendant.”).
98
Id. at 466. This language would become the root of the problem. See infra Part III.A.
Also, it was the language relied upon by countless other courts in allowing venue transfer
in factually different circumstances from Goldlawr. See Mayo Clinic v. Kaiser, 383 F.2d 653
(8th Cir. 1967); Dubin v. United States, 380 F.2d 813 (5th Cir. 1967); United States v.
Berkowitz, 328 F.2d 358 (3d Cir. 1964).
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whether the same analysis would apply when venue was proper, but
other federal courts wrestled with this question as time passed.99
2.

Venue Transfer Without Jurisdiction but Proper Venue

Goldlawr did not answer whether § 1404(a) could be used when the
court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant.100 Some courts
found the Goldawr analysis applied to § 1404(a) because it was the
companion section to § 1406(a).101 Other courts held that only § 1406(a)
applied when a court lacked jurisdiction because venue was technically
improper when a court lacked personal jurisdiction.102 One court did not
even specify if § 1404(a) or § 1406(a) applied, but it transferred the case
anyway.103 However, every court relied heavily on the language from

99

See Goldlawr, 369 U.S. at 468 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
And it is incongruous to consider, as the Court’s holding would seem
to imply, that in the ‘interest of justice’ Congress sought in § 1406(a) to
deal with the transfer of cases where both venue and jurisdiction are
lacking in the district where the action is commenced, while neglecting
to provide any comparable alleviative measures for the plaintiff who
selects a district where venue is proper but where personal jurisdiction
cannot be obtained.

Id.
100
See Martin v. Stokes, 623 F.2d 469 (6th Cir. 1980); Corke v. Sameiet M.S. Song, 572 F.2d
77 (2d Cir. 1978); Mayo Clinic, 383 F.2d at 655–56; Dubin, 380 F.2d at 815–16; Berkowitz, 328
F.2d at 361.
101
See Berkowitz, 328 F.2d at 361 (transferring under § 1404(a) when venue was proper
but the court lacked personal jurisdiction because it was the companion section of § 1406(a)
and should function equivalently).
102
All of these courts indicated that a transfer was to be made under § 1406(a) when
venue was proper but jurisdiction was lacking because the lack of jurisdiction made venue
technically improper. See Martin, 623 F.2d 469; Mayo Clinic, 383 F.2d 653; Dubin, 380 F.2d
813.
103
See Corke, 572 F.2d 77 (not specifying whether the transfer was utilized under § 1404(a)
or § 1406(a) when venue was proper but the court lacked personal jurisdiction).
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Goldlawr.104 United States v. Berkowitz105 was the first federal appellate
case to encounter this problem.106
In Berkowitz, the Third Circuit held that a court could transfer under
§ 1404(a) when a court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant.107
The Berkowitz court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant, but
venue was proper.108 The Berkowitz court determined that the analysis
from Goldlawr should apply to both § 1404(a) and § 1406(a) because they
were companion sections. 109 Relying heavily on the language from
Goldlawr, the Berkowitz court indicated that § 1406(a) was amply broad to
preserve a plaintiff’s claim by removing any obstacles that impede an
See supra Part II.B.1; supra note 94 (providing the Goldlawr language that courts relied
upon).
105
328 F.2d at 361. The case arose when the United States filed a tax evasion claim
against Morton Berkowitz in a district court in Pennsylvania. Id. at 359. Berkowitz was the
officer that was responsible for the delinquent payments of a large corporation. Id. The
suit was filed just seventeen days before the applicable statute of limitations would expire.
Id. Berkowitz then moved to dismiss because he was a citizen of New York and had not
been properly served. Id. The government moved for transfer pursuant to § 1404(a). Id.
The district court did not grant transfer under § 1404(a), and the government filed another
motion to transfer pursuant to § 1406(a). Id. However, the district court also denied that
motion and the government appealed. Id. at 360.
106
See 328 F.2d at 361.
107
Id. The Berkowitz court found that a court reserved discretion in considering whether
the action should be transferred pursuant to § 1404(a) because § 1404(a) still retained the
words “in the interests of justice,” which inherently granted the court discretion on
whether to transfer a claim, even when venue was proper. Id. A district court decision
presents the rationale for applying § 1404(a) when a court lacks jurisdiction. See Selsby v.
Vecchione, 216 F. Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). In Selsby v. Vecchione, the court specifically
found that § 1406(a) could not be used when venue was proper. Id. The plaintiff in Selsby
tried to move for a change of venue pursuant to § 1406(a) using the Goldlawr analysis. Id.
However, the court limited Goldlawr specifically to situations where venue was initially
wrong, and in Selsby venue was proper and therefore Goldlawr did not apply. Id. This
decision seemed to suggest that transfer without personal jurisdiction was limited to
instances only when venue was improper. Id.
108
328 F.2d at 360. The district court determined that tax liability arose in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, and the tax returns were filed there; hence, venue was technically
proper and § 1406(a) could not be used because the language indicated that it should be
used when venue was improper. Id. at 359; see also supra Part II.A.3 (indicating general
support that § 1406(a) only applies when venue is initially improper). Further, personal
jurisdiction was improper because Berkowitz was a citizen of New York and service of
process was not properly obtained. Berkowitz, 328 F.2d at 360.
109
Berkowitz, 328 F.2d at 361.
It is true that Goldlawr involved an interpretation of § 1406(a).
Nevertheless, we think that its rationale applies equally to § 1404(a),
for these are companion sections, remedial in nature, enacted at the
same time, and both dealing with the expeditious transfer of an action
from one district or division to another.
Id.
104
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expeditious trial.110 Therefore, because § 1406(a) was amply broad to
allow transfers when a court lacked personal jurisdiction over the
defendant, its companion section, § 1404(a), was also amply broad to
allow a court to transfer a case when it lacked personal jurisdiction even
though venue was proper.111 Despite the Third Circuit’s holding, other
courts did not find that § 1404(a) was applicable in instances where a
court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant when venue was
proper.112
The Eighth Circuit encountered the exact same situation as the Third
Circuit did in the Berkowitz case, but it concluded that § 1406(a) applied
even when venue was proper if a court lacked personal jurisdiction over
the defendant.113 In Mayo Clinic v. Kaiser,114 the Eighth Circuit found the
common problem when a court lacked personal jurisdiction over a
defendant was that the case could not proceed to trial on its merits,
regardless of whether venue was proper.115 The Mayo Clinic court found

110

Id.

The language of § 1406(a) is amply broad enough to authorize the
transfer of cases, however wrong the plaintiff may have been in filing
his case as to venue, whether the court in which it was filed had
personal jurisdiction over the defendants or not. The section is thus in
accord with the general purpose which has prompted many of the
procedural changes of the past few years–that of removing whatever
obstacles may impede an expeditious and orderly adjudication of cases
and controversies on their merits.
Goldlawr v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 466–67 (1962).
111
Berkowitz, 328 F.2d at 361. “We find it unnecessary to consider the Government’s
novel and intricate contention that venue may be properly laid in a district and, yet, the
case may be one ‘laying venue in the wrong district’ under § 1406(a), for . . . § 1404(a)
clearly authorizes the transfer of this civil action.” Id.
112
See Martin v. Stokes, 623 F.2d 469 (6th Cir. 1980); Corke v. Sameiet M.S. Song, 572 F.2d
77 (2d Cir. 1978); Mayo Clinic v. Kaiser, 383 F.2d 653 (8th Cir. 1967); Dubin v. United States,
380 F.2d 813 (5th Cir. 1967).
113
See Mayo Clinic, 383 F.2d 653. Edward Kaiser brought a medical malpractice suit in an
Illinois federal district court against Mayo Clinic, an association of individuals, and three
doctors of the Mayo Clinic. Id. at 653. All defendants were residents of Minnesota and
they moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Id. Kaiser moved to transfer the case
instead. Id. The district court found that the action was transferable under either § 1404(a)
or § 1406(a). Id. The Eighth Circuit found that only § 1406(a) could be used for a proper
transfer when a court lacked jurisdiction. Id.
114
383 F.2d 653.
115
Id. at 655–56.
Certainly a party who has been totally wrong in selecting the forum
would have no greater right of transfer under § 1406(a) than a party
who has selected a forum which is wrong only because service of
process cannot be obtained. In either event, the case could not proceed
to trial on its merits.
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that § 1406(a) was amply broad to remedy either situation.116 Ironically,
it relied on the exact same language from the Goldlawr case that the Third
Circuit relied on in Berkowitz. 117 The Sixth Circuit followed similar
reasoning when it found that a court could transfer pursuant to § 1406(a)
when it lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant.118
In Martin v. Stokes,119 the Sixth Circuit considered the analysis from
the Berkowitz case but found that § 1404(a) was simply a codification of
forum non conveniens, and thus, § 1404(a), like forum non conveniens,
presumed the existence of two permissible forums.120 Section 1404(a)
Id. The Mayo Clinic court followed the rationale set out in an earlier decision. Id. at 655; see
also Dubin, 380 F.2d at 814–16. Dubin was a tax case in which the defendant appealed a
previous judgment found against him. 380 F.2d at 814. Tax liability accrued and returns
were filed in Ohio, and so the government sued Dubin on the belief that he was a resident
of Ohio, specifically in the Northern District of Ohio. Id. However, the Ohio court could
not obtain personal jurisdiction over the appellant because he had recently moved to
Florida. Id. The government was faced with being barred by the statute of limitations if it
commenced the action again, so the government moved for transfer under § 1406(a). Id.
The Dubin court found that § 1406(a) was couched in terms of “laying venue in the wrong
division or district.” Id. at 815. Therefore, because § 1406(a) used that language instead of
“wrong venue,” the Dubin court found that “wrong division or district” meant anytime
there was an obstacle to an expeditious and orderly adjudication on the merits. Id. at 815–
16. Thus, the Fifth and Eighth Circuits relied on promoting efficiency in using § 1406(a),
just as Berkowitz relied on efficiency in promoting the use of § 1404(a). Id.; Mayo Clinic, 383
F.2d at 655; see also Miles v. Charles E. Smith Cos., 404 F. Supp. 467 (D. Md. 1975) (stating
specifically that the presence of venue does not remove a court’s discretionary authority to
pursue a transfer under § 1406(a) in the interest of justice).
116
383 F.2d at 655.
Looking to the language of § 1406, the statute is couched in terms of
“laying venue in the wrong division or district.” The statute does not
refer to “wrong” venue but rather to venue laid in a “wrong division
or district.” We conclude that a district is “wrong” within the meaning
of § 1406 whenever there exists an “obstacle [to] . . . an expeditious and
orderly adjudication on the merits.
Id. (quoting the decision in Dubin, 380 F.2d 813).
117
Id. at 655–56; see supra note 94 and accompanying text (language essentially stating
however wrong a plaintiff was in filing, a case could always be preserved).
118
See, e.g., Martin v. Stokes, 623 F.2d 469, 475 (6th Cir. 1980) (determining that § 1406(a)
was the proper mode of transfer when a court lacked jurisdiction because venue was
technically wrong); Taylor v. Love, 415 F.2d 1118, 1120 (6th Cir. 1970) (holding that transfer
would be proper under § 1406(a) when a court lacked personal jurisdiction over the
defendant because venue was wrong).
119
623 F.2d 469.
120
Id. at 473–74. In Martin, the plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident in
Kentucky. Id. at 470. The defendant was the mother of a child who struck the plaintiff. Id.
After settlement negotiations failed, the plaintiff learned that the applicable statute of
limitations in Kentucky was one year. Id. Therefore, the plaintiff filed a suit in federal
court based on diversity in the defendant’s home state of Virginia. Id. The defendants
motioned to transfer the case to Kentucky and to quash for improper service. Id. The
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was to be limited to instances when both personal jurisdiction and venue
were proper because only then was the original court where the action
was filed a permissible forum.121 Thus, the Martin court found that the
proper means of transfer was a broad interpretation of § 1406(a) because
§ 1406(a) was to be applied whenever there was an obstacle to
expeditious adjudication such as lack of personal jurisdiction over the
defendant, which was the analysis from Goldlawr.122 Despite all of these
varying interpretations, the Second Circuit came up with its own
analysis.123
In Corke v. Sameiet M.S. Song, 124 the Second Circuit did not use
§ 1404(a) or § 1406(a), but instead utilized a judicial gloss of the statutory
language of both.125 The Corke court concluded that transfer would be
proper in any given case so long as it was in the “interest of justice”
when a court lacked personal jurisdiction.126 The Corke court used this
reasoning because a court did not need to determine what venue

Virginia district court transferred the case; however, the district court that transferred the
case did not specify if it was transferred for convenience under § 1404(a) or for legal
impediment under § 1406(a). Id. Following the transfer, defendants filed for a motion to
dismiss the action, asserting that it was barred by the Kentucky statute of limitations. Id.
The Kentucky district court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss, and the plaintiff
appealed. Id. at 471.
121
Id. at 474 n.7 (referring to Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947), where the
Supreme Court defined the doctrine of forum non conveniens, which “presupposes at least
two forums in which the defendant is amenable to process; the doctrine furnishes criteria
for choice between them”).
122
Id. at 474. The Martin court noted the inconsistencies among the circuits in whether to
utilize § 1404(a) or § 1406(a) when transferring where personal jurisdiction is unobtainable.
Id. However, the court concluded that precedent demanded it apply § 1406(a) broadly. Id.
123
See Corke v. Sameiet M.S. Song, 572 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1978) (failing to specify whether
§ 1404(a) or § 1406(a) authorized the transfer when a court lacked personal jurisdiction over
the defendant but venue was proper).
124
Id.
125
Id. at 80. The action was originally filed in the federal district court in the Western
District of New York. Id. at 78. Corke sued for personal injuries sustained during a cruise
on the defendant’s ship based on negligence in maintenance of the vessel and malpractice
by the ship’s doctor. Id. Corke moved for transfer. Id. However, the defendants moved
for dismissal on the grounds that the court lacked jurisdiction over them, which was
granted. Id. Corke then appealed. Id.
126
Id. at 80. Specifically, the Corke court cited a federal district court decision from the
Southern District of New York where the judge said a court “has power to transfer the case
even if there is no personal jurisdiction over the defendants, and whether or not venue is
proper in [the] district, if a transfer would be in the interest of justice.” Id. (quoting Volk
Corp. v. Art-Pak Clip Art Serv., 432 F. Supp. 1179, 1181 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)).
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provision was needed, which was a simpler and more efficient
approach.127
In sum, courts were split on whether to transfer a case under
§ 1404(a) or § 1406(a) when venue was proper but personal jurisdiction
over the defendant was lacking.128 Courts after Goldlawr, like Berkowitz,
Mayo Clinic, Martin, and Corke, used different transfer provisions to reach
the same end. 129 The Berkowitz court utilized § 1404(a), while other
courts, such as Mayo Clinic and Martin, found that only § 1406(a) could
be used when a court lacked personal jurisdiction.130 However, despite
the use of different statutes, the end result was the same in Berkowitz,
Mayo Clinic, Martin, and Corke, in that a case could be transferred when a
court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant but was also a
proper venue.131 Essentially, the Corke court, rather than pretending that
a distinction between § 1404(a) and § 1406(a) was important, stated the
rule then in existence: When a court lacks jurisdiction the court should
preserve the plaintiff’s claim in a venue transfer.132

127
Id. at 81. The court did not specifically say efficiency was the goal for its decision, but
it did note with regards to the particular facts of the case at hand that “[b]ecause transfer is
so clearly warranted by the facts at hand, it is unnecessary to waste the district court’s
valuable time by requiring a hearing on transferability.” Id. Thus, efficiency seemed to be
in the court’s mind when it made its decision. Id.
128
See supra Part II.B.2 (exemplifying the circuit split as to whether § 1404(a) or § 1406(a)
applied when a court transferred a case even though it lacked personal jurisdiction).
129
See Martin v. Stokes, 623 F.2d 469 (6th Cir. 1980); Corke, 572 F.2d at 78-79; Mayo Clinic,
383 F.2d at 655–56; Dubin, 380 F.2d at 815–16; Berkowitz, 328 F.2d at 361; Finzi, supra note 6,
at 988.
Goldlawr held that section 1406 could be used to transfer claims
defective as to both personal jurisdiction and venue. It did not address
the applicability of section 1406 to claims defective only as to personal
jurisdiction.
Courts confronted with claims that met venue
requirements but fell outside their territorial jurisdiction thus faced a
dilemma. They could have remained faithful to the language of
section 1406 and refused to transfer a claim filed in a proper venue.
This, however, would have placed the plaintiff who had erred as to
both personal jurisdiction and venue in a better position than the
plaintiff who had erred only as to personal jurisdiction. Unwilling to
sanction this obvious injustice, courts universally rejected this
approach. Instead, courts resorted to various interpretations of both
transfer provisions to reach the result desired.
Finzi, supra note 6, at 986.
130
See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the language, purpose, and application of § 1404(a)).
131
See supra notes 119–22 and accompanying text (indicating that because venue was
technically improper when a court lacked jurisdiction, the venue was improper).
132
See supra notes 119–22 and accompanying text. However, even if a court were to
utilize the Corke approach, finding that it is proper to transfer under either § 1404(a) or
§ 1406(a), this decision does not solve the enigma of which choice of law follows from a
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However, this dilemma merely planted the seed for problems in
venue transfer. 133 Goldlawr and its progeny had determined that
§ 1404(a) and § 1406(a) functioned equivalently when venue was proper
but a court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant.134 The next
question was which choice of law to apply following a transfer when a
court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant.135 Because of the
inherent differences in the choice of law that was supposed to follow
each of the venue transfer provisions, transferor state law with § 1404(a)
and transferee state law with § 1406(a), a court’s decision to use either
§ 1404(a) or § 1406(a) would be significant.136
3.

Intersection of “Proper Venue but Improper Jurisdiction Transfers”
and “Choice of Law”

When Goldlawr analysis intersected with choice of law analysis,
courts were unsure of whether to follow choice of law standards for
§ 1404(a) and § 1406(a) or to circumvent choice of law rules because
following the established standards would be unfair to either defendants
or plaintiffs. 137 Some courts deviated from established principles of
choice of law with § 1404(a) and § 1406(a) and some courts did not.138
transfer under circumstances where jurisdiction is improper. See MOORE ET AL., supra note
1, § 111.02.
133
See infra Parts II.B.3, III.B (showing how courts that used the Goldlawr analysis ran into
difficulties with what choice of law to apply).
134
See infra Parts II.B.3, III.B (indicating that courts used both statutes to perform the
same function: transfer a case when the court lacked personal jurisdiction but venue was
proper).
135
See infra Part II.B.3 (discussing how courts inconsistently determined which choice of
law to apply following a transfer when venue was proper but the court lacked personal
jurisdiction over the defendant).
136
See supra Parts II.A.2–3 for a general discussion on which choice of law was supposed
to apply following a venue transfer under § 1404(a) and § 1406(a).
137
See Nelson v. Int’l Paint Co., 716 F.2d 640 (9th Cir. 1983); Ellis v. Great Sw. Corp., 646
F.2d 1099 (5th Cir. 1981); Mayo Clinic v. Kaiser, 383 F.2d 653 (8th Cir. 1967).
138
See, e.g., Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 523–25 (1990) (showing that even
when a plaintiff moves for a transfer under § 1404(a), courts shall apply the law of the
transferor court); Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 639 (1964) (indicating that in a
transfer under § 1404(a), the law of the transferor court shall apply when defendants move
for a transfer); Tel-Phonic Serv., Inc. v. TBS Int’l, Inc., 975 F.2d 1134, 1141 (5th Cir. 1992)
(indicating that regardless of who made the transfer under § 1406(a), transferee court law
must apply); LaVay Corp. v. Dominion Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 830 F.2d 522, 526 (4th Cir.
1987) (citing Manley v. Engram, 755 F.2d 1463 (11th Cir. 1985)) (indicating that courts have
generally concluded that a transferee court must apply the law of its own state following a
transfer to avoid forum shopping by plaintiffs). Even though the Sixth Circuit, in Martin v.
Stokes, remanded the case without holding on to the issue of which statute of limitations to
apply, the Sixth Circuit did comment that choice of law principles should apply. 623 F.2d
469, 475 (6th Cir. 1980). The Martin court indicated that the trial court had to determine
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Essentially, courts would decide which choice of law to apply following
a transfer based on lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendant on a
case-by-case basis.139 The Eighth Circuit was the first to deviate from
established choice of law principles.140
The Mayo Clinic court encountered a problem with choice of law
based on venue transfer when a court lacked personal jurisdiction over
the defendant.141 In Mayo Clinic, the case was originally filed in a district
whether the original transferor court had personal jurisdiction over the defendant and then
decide which law to apply based on that determination. Id. The Martin court said that if
the transferor court did have jurisdiction, then the transfer would have to have been made
under § 1404(a) and the transferor court law would apply, but if the transferor court lacked
jurisdiction, then the transfer would have to be made under § 1406(a) and the transferee
court law would apply. Id. However, the inconsistencies among the courts in which
transfer device to use, either § 1404(a) or § 1406(a), when a court lacked jurisdiction, caused
later courts to deviate from the standard that Martin expressed. See Ellis, 646 F.2d 1099;
Mayo Clinic, 383 F.2d 653.
139
See Bayles, supra note 91, at 639.
Considerations of efficiency relate to the allocation of judicial
resources. A heavy burden would be placed upon courts if each case
were to be treated as one of first impression. In the complete absence
of the principle, each case could presumably be taken all the way to the
court of final review—at least there would be no clear reason no to do
so. Moreover, in each case courts would have to raise anew all the
arguments for and against each rule, even though they would
continually arrive at the same conclusion when one rule is clearly
preferable over another . . . Utilization of the principle of stability
insures that few previously settled issues will be appealed . . . thereby
enabling courts to devote their time and energy to issues of first
impression and those involving rules which create serious injustice or
disutility.
Id. However, plaintiffs should be concerned about the inconsistent results of the courts
with venue transfer because it will delay litigation of issues on the merits, and extended
time between the start of the law suit and trial allows a defendant to retain the value of
judgment during the delay. See Carrie E. Johnson, Comment, Rocket Dockets: Reducing
Delay in Federal Civil Litigation, 85 CAL. L. REV. 225, 231 (1997). Also, delaying resolution
disadvantages plaintiffs with a low economic status because they may lack the means to
support themselves and continue the litigation. Id. Lastly, such high court costs may
prevent plaintiffs from bringing valid claims in the first place to avoid the time-consuming
and expensive process of litigation. Id. Thus, plaintiffs should be just as concerned about
the inefficiency of venue transfer as defendants. Id.
140
See Mayo Clinic, 383 F.2d 653.
141
Id. at 653. There are more problems than just the statute of limitations with choice of
law in a venue transfer when a court lacks personal jurisdiction that undermine efficiency
and defendant rights. See infra notes 142, 145 and accompanying text (showing that the
true problem in Mayo Clinic was the difference of when an action commenced to begin the
running of the statute of limitations). However, those problems are often associated or
linked to the statute of limitations. See Mayo Clinic, 383 F.2d 653. This Note often refers
only to the statute of limitations because it serves as a particularly good example of how
inefficient the system has become, other choice of law differences are often incorporated in
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court where venue was proper but the court lacked personal jurisdiction
over the defendant. 142 The Mayo Clinic court transferred under
§ 1406(a).143 The statute of limitations had not run in either state when
the case was filed, but it had run in both states by the time the transfer
was made.144 However, the Mayo Clinic court faced a problem where the
case would be barred if the state law of the transferee court applied as
§ 1406(a) demanded, but it would not be barred if the state law of the
transferor court applied.145
As a result of this dilemma, the Mayo Clinic court ignored the
established principle that transfers under § 1406(a) should apply the
state law of the transferee court, and the Mayo Clinic court determined
that the appropriate state law to apply was the state law of the transferor
court.146 The Mayo Clinic court acknowledged that:

the statute of limitations, and it is a protection often relied upon by defendants. See id.
(showing that a difference in choice of law service of process affects the statute of
limitations); Eli J. Richardson, Eliminating the Limitations of Limitations Law, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
1015, 1021 (1997) (describing the common viewpoint that the statute of limitations is to
protect defendants from litigating old claims). Further, § 1631 deals specifically with the
issue of the statute of limitations based on the commencement of actions. 28 U.S.C. § 1631
(2000). Therefore, this Note focuses on the statute of limitations. See infra Part II.C
(providing the language and interpretation of § 1631, which incorporates statute of
limitations problems).
142
383 F.2d at 653. More specifically, the case was originally filed in Illinois where venue
was proper but the court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Id. The
defendant moved to quash the service of process issued by the Illinois court, which was
granted. Id. The plaintiff then moved to transfer the case to Minnesota where both venue
and jurisdiction were proper. Id. Summons was re-issued out of the Minnesota court and
the plaintiff had to serve the defendant again. Id. By this time the statute of limitations had
run. Id.
143
Id. at 655; see supra notes 113–18 (explaining the Mayo Clinic decision in further detail).
144
383 F.2d at 653.
145
The particular problem was purely based on choice of law. See Kaiser v. Mayo Clinic,
260 F. Supp. 900, 908 (D. Minn. 1966). In Illinois, “every action, unless otherwise expressly
provided by statute, shall be commenced by the filing of a complaint.” 735 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/2-201 (2004). In Minnesota, “[a] civil action is commenced against each defendant:
a) when the summons is served upon that defendant.” MINN. R. CIV. P. 3.01 (2004). Thus, if
the transferee law of Minnesota applied, the case would be barred by the statute of
limitations, whereas it would not be if the transferor court law of Illinois applied. Kaiser,
260 F. Supp. at 908. Because the Illinois court quashed the original service of process, the
problem arose. Id. at 653; see also supra note 124 and accompanying text (describing this
complex fact pattern in more detail).
146
Mayo Clinic, 383 F.2d at 656. (“We have reached the conclusion that under the facts
here the law of the transferor forum should govern and that the question of
commencement of the action is, therefore, governed by the law of Illinois.”); cf. Taylor v.
Love, 415 F.2d 1118, 1120 (6th Cir. 1970) (“[W]e conclude that a district is ‘wrong’ within
the meaning of § 1406 whenever there exists an ‘obstacle [to] . . . an expeditious and orderly
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It has been stated before that the purpose for making
transfers would be obliterated in many cases if the
statute of limitations of the transferee forum were
applied at the date of transfer, and that if such were the
rule there would be little purpose in transferring the
case instead of dismissing it.147
Therefore, the Mayo Clinic court held that the foundation of which state’s
law to apply with a § 1406(a) transfer, which was typically the transferee
court, could be changed depending on the factual situation because the
ultimate purpose of the venue statutes was to preserve claims.148
The Mayo Clinic court essentially used the Goldlawr analysis to
deviate from the established rules of § 1406(a), which was to apply the
state law of the transferee court.149 Other courts deviated from choice of
law principles with § 1404(a) as well when transferring a case under
§ 1404(a) when a court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant.150
For example, the Fifth Circuit held that the state law of the transferee
court should apply when the court lacks personal jurisdiction over the
defendant but transfers pursuant to § 1404(a). 151 In Ellis v. Great
adjudication’ on the merits. Inability to perfect service of process on a defendant in an
otherwise correct venue is such an obstacle.”); Kinergy Corp. v. Conveyor Dynamics Corp.,
No. Civ.A.3: 99CV-407-S, 2001 WL 1774435, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 6, 2001) (holding that a
case should be transferred to another district court when the transferor court lacked
personal jurisdiction over the defendant to preserve the claim even though the statute of
limitations had run in the transferee court). But cf. Froelich v. Petrelli, 472 F. Supp. 756, 763
(D. Haw. 1979) (refusing to transfer a case under § 1406(a) because it was not in the
plaintiff’s interests to do so when the statute of limitations had run in the transferee forum
before the plaintiff filed in the transferor forum).
147
383 F.2d at 656; see Porter v. Groat, 840 F.2d 255, 257 (4th Cir. 1988) (determining that a
transfer under § 1406(a) is in the interests of justice when the statute of limitations bars the
action in the transferor court but would not bar it in the transferee court). But see Spar, Inc.
v. Informational Res., Inc., 956 F.2d 392, 394 (2d Cir. 1992) (prohibiting a transfer when the
statute of limitations has run in the transferor forum because diligent plaintiffs should be
aware of it).
148
383 F.2d at 656. “Also, in Goldlawr, . . . it was held that jurisdiction was not necessary
to toll the statute of limitations.” Id.
149
See MOORE ET AL., supra note 1, § 111.02 (“Several circuits maintain that procedural
obstacles other than lack of personal jurisdiction that prevent an action from proceeding in
the original court, such as statute of limitations, make venue ‘wrong’ and thereby make,
theoretically, Section 1406(a) the proper vehicle for transfer.”).
150
See Ellis v. Great Sw. Corp., 646 F.2d 1099 (5th Cir. 1981) (utilizing a transfer under
§ 1404(a) even though it lacked jurisdiction over the defendant because precedent
demanded it).
151
Id. at 1108. In Ellis, the plaintiff filed a wrongful death action in Arkansas two years
after his wife fell off of a “log ride” at the Six Flags Amusement Park in Arlington, Texas,
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Southwestern Corp., 152 the Fifth Circuit determined that allowing a
plaintiff to capture the state law of the transferor court when the court
lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant would be unfair to the
defendant. 153 Therefore, the Ellis court held that the state law of the
transferee forum should apply regardless of whether § 1404(a) or
§ 1406(a) was used when a court transferred a case because the court
lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 154 The Ellis court
avoided the possible injustice to defendants, and it also deprived
plaintiffs of a possible forum shopping mechanism.155 The Ellis court,
which caused her death. Id. at 1101. The named defendants had no minimum contacts
with Arkansas, and therefore Ellis moved for transfer. Id. However, it was ambiguous as
to whether the Arkansas district court used § 1404(a) or § 1406(a) when it transferred. Id. at
1102. Arkansas had a three-year statute of limitations and Texas had a two-year statute of
limitations. Id. Thus, the Ellis court had to determine which choice of law applied under
the venue transfer provisions to determine which statute of limitations to apply because if
the Arkansas statute applied, the plaintiff’s claim endured, whereas if the Texas statute
applied, it would be barred. Id.
152
646 F.2d 1099 (5th Cir. 1981).
153
Id. at 1108.
When the venue in the district in which the action is brought is proper,
but service of process cannot be had there, . . . [i]n such a situation
plaintiff could not maintain his action in the district in which he filed
it, and therefore could not take advantage of the law governing that
district, since he could not obtain jurisdiction of the defendant.
Therefore he should not be permitted to file his action there for the
purpose of capturing the law of that jurisdiction for transportation to
the jurisdiction in which service can be obtained.
Id. (quoting MOORE ET AL., supra note 1, § 111.02 ).
154
Id. at 1109–10.
[W]e hold that following a 1406(a) transfer, regardless of which party
requested the transfer or the purpose behind the transfer, the
transferee court must apply the choice of law rules of the state in
which it sits. . . . [W]e hold that following a section 1404(a) transfer
from a district in which personal jurisdiction over the defendant could
not be obtained, the transferee court must apply the choice of law rules
of the state in which it sits, regardless of which party requested the
transfer. . . . We are not presented with, and need not resolve, the
question of which state’s choice of law rules should be applied when,
upon the motion of a plaintiff a section 1404(a) transfer has been made
from a district in which venue was proper and personal jurisdiction
over the defendant had been or could have been obtained.
Id. at 1110–11.
155
Id. at 1110 (“The result of our holding will be to ensure that the ‘accident’ of federal
diversity jurisdiction does not enable a party to utilize a transfer to achieve a result in
federal court which could not have been achieved in the courts of the State where the
action was filed.”). But see Callan v. Lillybelle, Ltd., 39 F.R.D. 600, 603 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)
(determining that the Hanna outcome determinative test demands that the law of the
transferor court should apply following a transfer under § 1404(a) when a court lacked
jurisdiction over the defendant; otherwise the action would be barred and contravene the
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like the Eighth Circuit in Mayo Clinic, still departed from established
choice of law principles with venue transfer, except with § 1404(a)
instead of § 1406(a).156
Thus, courts deviated from established principles in choice of law
with § 1404(a) and § 1406(a) and they disagreed on the purpose for
straying from those principles.157 For example, Mayo Clinic averted from
the typical choice of law application of § 1406(a), which was to apply the
law of the transferee court, because it was compelled to preserve the
plaintiff’s claim. 158 Further, the Mayo Clinic court could not rely on
§ 1404(a) standards, which were to apply the transferor court law,
because it decided to use § 1406(a); consequently, it differed from
established principles.159 Conversely, the Ellis court utilized § 1404(a) to
transfer a case when a court lacked personal jurisdiction over the
defendant and also departed from established choice of law principles
just like the Mayo Clinic court, but its purposes for doing so was to

remedial purpose of § 1404(a)).
For a short explanation of the Hanna outcome
determinative test see supra note 60 and accompanying text.
156
646 F.2d at 1110. The Fifth Circuit truly wished to follow the logic outlined in Martin
v. Stokes, 623 F.2d 469 (6th Cir. 1980). Id.; see supra note 137 and accompanying text
(explaining the Martin analysis in applying choice of law after a venue transfer when a
court lacks personal jurisdiction). However, the Fifth Circuit was compelled to follow its
own precedent, which allowed for a transfer under § 1404(a) when a court lacked
jurisdiction. Ellis, 436 F.2d at 1109. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit utilized transfers under
§ 1404(a) when a court lacked jurisdiction but deviated from which choice of law to apply
as established in Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964). Id.; see supra notes 63–64 and
accompanying text (describing the principle that a court should apply the state law of the
transferor court following a transfer). However, the Fifth Circuit did so to prevent plaintiff
forum shopping rather than to protect plaintiff claims, as the Eighth Circuit did in Mayo
Clinic. 646 F.2d at 1108–09; see supra note 74 and accompanying text (discussing forum
shopping and particular concerns with it in choice of law).
157
See supra Part II.C; see also Marcus, supra note 42, at 696.
Van Dusen did not articulate any theoretical basis for concluding that,
by exercising the venue privilege, plaintiff acquires the right to have a
certain state’s law apply. Analysis ultimately leads to the conclusion
that there is none. Instead, the Court’s emphasis on the venue
privilege appears to result from the absence of federal principles for
choice of state law, turning the selection of law into a game of chess in
which the plaintiff gets the opening move.
Id.
158
See supra notes 113–17 and accompanying text (discussing the analysis and application
of the Mayo Clinic decision in relation to § 1406(a)).
159
See supra notes 107–12 and accompanying text (discussing the Berkowitz decision).
However, even if Berkowitz did such an action, applying the transferor law after a lack of
jurisdiction venue transfer, this result would encourage plaintiffs to forum shop because
they could capture a state’s law that lacked jurisdiction over the defendant, and hence, the
dilemma of the post-Goldlawr decisions. See supra Part II.B.1.
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preserve fairness to the defendant.160 Nelson v. International Paint Co.161
sets precisely the standard for what courts were doing when they
encountered this situation.162
The Nelson court acknowledged and directly declined to follow the
Mayo Clinic analysis. 163 The Nelson court found that instances where
transfer had been made to cure a lack of personal jurisdiction under
either § 1404(a) or § 1406(a) required a court to apply the state law of the
transferee court in order to prevent forum shopping and deny
advantages to a plaintiff that he should not be entitled to have.164 Thus,
the Nelson court transferred under § 1406(a) and held, following
established choice of law rules with § 1406(a), that the law of the
transferee court should apply.165 The Nelson court acknowledged Mayo
Clinic but found its decision was factually distinguishable; thus, two
courts applied § 1406(a) with a different choice of law decision following

See supra notes 150–55 and accompanying text (discussing the Ellis decision and
analysis).
161
716 F.2d 640 (9th Cir. 1983). The plaintiff, Alfred Nelson, was injured when he inhaled
toxic fumes while painting over a weld at a construction site in Alaska. Id. at 642. Nelson
then sued the paint manufacturer and distributor in Texas. Id. The named defendant was
International Paint Company, but the plaintiff learned that the actual manufacturer was
Calco. Id. Calco moved to dismiss the complaint based on lack of personal jurisdiction. Id.
The district court then ordered the claim against Calco to be transferred to a court that had
jurisdiction, a district court in California. Id. After transfer, Calco moved to dismiss
because the appropriate statute of limitations in California had run. Id.
162
See infra notes 163–67 and accompanying text (discussing the Nelson decision and
analysis).
163
716 F.2d at 643–44 (“We decline to follow Mayo Clinic; it is a minority view and is
factually distinguishable.”).
164
Id. at 643.
In determining whether the laws of the transferor or the transferee
state apply to a diversity action that was transferred from one state to
another . . . we distinguish between cases transferred for the
convenience of one of the parties under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), and cases
transferred under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a) or 1406(a) to cure a lack of
personal jurisdiction in the district where the case was first brought. In
the former cases, we must apply the law of the transferor court to
prevent parties from seeking a change in venue to take advantage of
more favorable laws in another forum . . . . In the latter type of cases,
however, it is necessary to look to the law of the transferee state, also
to prevent forum shopping, and to deny plaintiffs choice-of-law
advantages to which they would not have been entitled in the proper
forum.
Id.
165
Id.
160
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the transfer.166 The end result was that courts were determining which
choice of law to apply on a case-by-case basis.167
Thus, Goldlawr led some courts to diverge from established
principles of choice of law while others did not. 168 The result was
confusion in which choice of law to apply with venue transfer
provisions. 169 The irony, of course, was venue transfer that was
supposed to promote efficiency was actually producing the antithesis
because courts were wasting resources, wasting time, and attorneys
could not be certain of the rules.170 Courts recognized this problem, and
they attempted to remedy it by using a new transfer provision, § 1631.171

Id. at 643–44. The Nelson court noted the Mayo Clinic decision but distinguished itself
on the fact that one of the defendants in Nelson had not been served until the statute of
limitations had run in both states prior to the transfer. Id. Despite the fact that the Nelson
court distinguished its case from Mayo Clinic, it is important to note that it strongly held
that transfers due to lack of personal jurisdiction should apply the transferee court law, and
thus, the contrary results between Nelson and Mayo Clinic show the wide latitude courts
assumed when a transfer took place. Id. at 644.
167
See supra Part II.B.3 (recapping how courts’ decisions were extremely varied in
determining which state law to apply following a venue transfer when a court lacked
personal jurisdiction).
168
See supra Part II.B.3; see infra Part III.A (showing the background and the analysis that
Goldlawr was the reason courts diverged from established principles of choice of law).
169
See supra note 91 and accompanying text (discussing how a lack of uniformity
undercuts certainty and efficiency). The history of the Fifth Circuit’s decisions on venue
transfer when a court lacks personal jurisdiction is so confusing and inconsistent that the
decisions are worth discussing to accentuate this point. First, the Fifth Circuit reasoned by
analogy from Goldlawr that § 1404(a) could be applied when a court lacked personal
jurisdiction. See Koehring Co. v. Hyde Constr. Co., 324 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1963). Later, in
Dubin the court held that § 1406(a) could be a proper transfer provision when jurisdiction
was lacking and venue was proper. See Dubin v. United States, 380 F.2d 813 (5th Cir. 1967).
Ironically, the Dubin court criticized the Berkowitz court for authorizing the use of § 1404(a)
in such situations, even though it had done so several years earlier. Id. at 816. Then, of
course, Ellis and the decision it relied on, Aguacate Consol. Mines, Inc. v. Deeprock, Inc., 566
F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1978), suggested that either § 1404(a) or § 1406(a) could be used. See Ellis
v. Great Sw. Corp., 646 F.2d 1099 (5th Cir. 1981). Thus, the history of the Fifth Circuit
shows how tumultuous the application of venue transfer can become, even to the point of
the court, in essence, criticizing itself when it criticized Berkowitz. Clearly, this example
shows the lack of efficiency.
170
See supra Part II.B; infra Part III; see also AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, THE
JUDICIAL POWER OF THE COMMONWEALTH: A REVIEW OF THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1903 AND
RELATED LEGISLATION, Report no. 92 (2001), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au. The
Australian Law Reform Commission (“ALRC”) found that transfer procedures that are too
complex or structurally deficient might increase litigation, result in delays, and increase
costs. AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, supra. The ALRC also notes venue transfer
is an integral part of a federal system to ensure that proceedings are heard as soon as
possible. Id.
171
See 28 U.S.C. § 1631 (2000).
166
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C. Section 1631: A Possible Redemption
In 1982, Congress passed the Federal Courts Improvement Act of
1982, which reformed parts of the federal civil procedure and practice.172
One of the laws in the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 was 28
U.S.C. § 1631.173 Some argue that § 1631’s focus on defects made at the
time of the complaint suggests that § 1631 was meant purely for
instances where the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.174 However,
Jeffrey W. Tayon, The Federal Transfer Statute: 28 U.S.C. § 1631, 29 S. TEX. L. REV. 189
(1987). The main purpose of the 1982 Act was to create a new federal appellate court
known as the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Id. at 200. This court
was to be a specialized court with limited subject matter jurisdiction possessed by the
former United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and Appellate Division of the
Court of Claims. Id. Mr. Tayon asserts that § 1631 was enacted at the same time to correct
the problem of involuntary dismissal of actions due to specific subject matter requirements.
Id.
173
28 U.S.C. § 1631.
Whenever a civil action is filed in a court as defined in section 610 of
this title or an appeal, including a petition for review of administrative
action, is noticed for or filed with such a court and that court finds that
there is a want of jurisdiction, the court shall, if it is in the interest of
justice, transfer such action or appeal to any other such court in which
the action or appeal could have been brought at the time it was filed or
noticed, and the action or appeal shall proceed as if it had been filed in
or noticed for the court to which it is transferred on the date upon
which it was actually filed in or noticed for the court from which it is
transferred.
Id. The emerging differences in the interpretation of § 1631 can best be described as a range
of gradations rather than a circuit split. See John B. Oakley, Prospectus for the American Law
Institute’s Federal Judicial Code Revision Project, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 855, 978–82 (1998). The
most expansive approach states that § 1631 can cure any type of jurisdictional defect,
including in rem jurisdiction. See United States v. Am. River Transp., Inc., 150 F.R.D. 587
(D.C. Ill. 1993). Some courts have utilized § 1631 when there is absolutely no defect in
personal jurisdiction at all. See Dornbusch v. Comm’r, 860 F.2d 611, 614 (5th Cir. 1988)
(“1631 could not reasonably be read as an implied denial of power to transfer . . . rather
. . . 1631 was impliedly confirmatory of the inherent power to transfer in such an
instance.”); see also Alexander v. Comm’r, 825 F.2d 499, 501–02 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (providing
that § 1631 did not revoke the power of the court to transfer a case when jurisdiction was
proper but venue was not, even though it did not specifically warrant it). However, this
Note focuses just on the analysis by courts that § 1631 authorizes transfer when a court
lacks personal jurisdiction or subject matter jurisdiction, and the other analysis that § 1631
is not applicable in instances when a court lacks personal jurisdiction because Goldlawr and
its progeny dealt primarily with allowing a transfer when a court lacked personal
jurisdiction. See supra Part II.B.
174
Tayon, supra note 172, at 224. Mr. Tayon suggests that § 1631 was passed to remedy a
specific problem dealing with subject matter jurisdiction. Id. He illustrates what § 1631
solved by presenting a hypothetical:
A nonpatent attorney represents corporate and individual defendants
in a patent infringement suit. As one might expect, the patent is held
valid and infringed, and the defendants are found liable for substantial
172
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the first interpretation of § 1631 by a circuit court applied a broader
interpretation and declared that § 1631 was to be utilized specifically to
alleviate the certainty and efficiency problems that Goldlawr and its
progeny caused.175
1.

The Broad Interpretation

In Ross v. Colorado Outward Bound School,176 the court was concerned
specifically with how complicated venue transfer had become because of
the decisions following Goldlawr.177

sums in damages. Sometime after . . . trial counsel files a timely notice
of appeal with a regional circuit court of appeals. Subsequent to this
event, trial counsel is replaced by a patent specialist to conduct the
appeal. Upon review of the file, new counsel realizes that the notice of
appeal has recited the wrong appellate court; that the appeal has been
noticed naming the wrong appellate court; that exclusive subject
matter jurisdiction resides in the Federal Circuit; and that the time for
filing a notice of appeal naming the Federal Circuit had lapsed. In
order preserve the defendants’ rights and avoid a malpractice action
against the nonpatent trial counsel, can dismissal of the appeal be
avoided?
Id. at 190. Mr. Tayon suggests that § 1631 was meant to specifically resolve this type of
situation because the result was that litigants were sometimes denied access to federal
courts because of an attorney’s error or ambiguity in the jurisdictional statute. Id. at 187,
201. Specifically, Mr. Tayon notes that Judge Leventhal suggested the need for such a
statute as § 1631 in a similar type of case as the problem presented above, and Judge
Leventhal specifically requested congressional action. Id. at 198–99. Shortly thereafter,
Congress passed § 1631 in the 1982 Act. Id. at 199–201. Thus, the timeliness of the statute
suggests that it was passed for this sort of reason, but Mr. Tayon provides other reasons to
suggest that § 1631 applies only to instances of subject matter jurisdiction as well. Id. at
224. Mr. Tayon notes that because jurisdiction is determined at the time the complaint is
filed in the transferor court, subsequent events have no effect on the subject matter
determination. Id. Therefore, because personal jurisdiction depends on service of process
and other issues subsequent to the filing of the complaint, and § 1631 seems to focus on
jurisdictional defects apparent at the time the complaint was filed, § 1631 apparently seems
to deal only with subject matter jurisdiction. Id. Further, § 1631’s legislative history
specifically states “subject matter jurisdiction” in its language. Id. at 201 n.60; see also infra
note 189 and accompanying text (providing the legislative history of § 1631).
175
See Ross v. Colo. Outward Bound Sch., 822 F.2d 1524 (10th Cir. 1987).
176
Id. at 1524.
177
Id. at 1526. (“We hold that the proper vehicle for the transfer of this action was 28
U.S.C. § 1631.”). The action arose when Sonya Ross died in a mountain climbing accident in
Colorado. Id. at 1525. Sonya was a New York resident who was attending the Colorado
Outward Bound School. Id. Sonya’s mother brought this wrongful death action against the
school in New York. Id. The case was originally filed in state court, but it was removed
because there was diversity of citizenship. Id. In Ross, the defendant moved to dismiss an
action in a New York district court due to lack of personal jurisdiction. Id. Rather than
dismissing the action, the district court ordered a transfer to the district in Colorado
pursuant to § 1406(a). Id. Once the case arrived there, the defendant moved to dismiss the
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Prior to that date, in determining whether the laws of
the transferor or the transferee state applied in diversity
cases transferred from one state to another, it was
necessary to distinguish between cases transferred
under § 1404(a) and cases transferred under § 1406(a) —
an often difficult task. In the former, the law of the
transferor state was applied . . . . In the latter, the law of
the transferee state was applied.178
To alleviate the complex problem with choice of law, the Ross court
snatched the opportunity to use a different venue transfer provision,
§ 1631, so that § 1404(a) and § 1406(a) could function as they did before
Goldlawr.179 Specifically, the Ross court stated: “By statute, courts now
know what law to apply and, more importantly in view of the facts of
this case, when that law applies.”180 Hence, the Ross court held that the
proper vehicle for transfer when a court lacked personal jurisdiction was
§ 1631 rather than § 1404(a) or § 1406(a).181
More recently, the Sixth Circuit agreed with the Tenth Circuit in
Roman v. Ashcroft. 182 The Sixth Circuit expanded § 1631 further by
stating that it was broad enough to cover a transfer when a court lacked
either personal jurisdiction or subject matter jurisdiction.183 The Roman

action on that ground that Colorado law should govern because the transfer took place
under § 1406 and was therefore barred by the Colorado statute of limitations. Id. at 1526.
The Colorado court then dismissed the action. Id. Upon appeal, the Tenth Circuit found a
different solution. Id.
178
Id. at 1527.
179
Id. The transferor court law was supposed to apply in situations utilizing § 1404(a)
and transferee court law with § 1406. Id. The court also noted the broad construction of
§ 1406(a), specifically pointing to those cases that utilized it where venue was proper and
personal jurisdiction was lacking. Id. In a short summary, the court outlined the problem
described in Part II of this text. Id.
180
Id.
181
Id. at 1526 (“That statute requires . . . an action is transferred from one federal court to
another federal court to cure want of jurisdiction, the action shall proceed as if it had been
filed in the transferee court on the date upon which it was actually filed in the transferor
court.”).
182
340 F.3d 314 (6th Cir. 2003).
183
Id. at 328. Roman was a native citizen of the Dominican Republic. Id. at 316. In
September of 1999, Roman pled guilty to fraud and misuse of visas, permits, and other
documents. Id. Hence, the INS filed charges to remove him based on (1) conviction related
to document fraud, (2) conviction of a crime that involved moral turpitude within five
years of entry, and (3) conviction of an aggravated felony. Id. 316–17. The case was
initially filed in the Northern District Court of Ohio, but the court lacked personal
jurisdiction over the defendant. Id. at 317. The district court granted the defendant’s
motion to dismiss, which was then appealed to the Sixth Circuit where it determined
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court determined that Congress intended to give broad authority to
permit transfers of any action between federal courts, and that courts like
the Ross court have followed that intent by construing § 1631 broadly.184
Further, the language of § 1631 was amply broad to support a broad
interpretation because it only mentioned “jurisdiction” instead of any
specific type of jurisdiction.185
Therefore, some courts have read § 1631 broadly to allow transfer of
a case when a court lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant to
alleviate the problems that Goldlawr caused with venue transfer and
choice of law.186 However, other courts have construed § 1631 narrowly
to apply only to instances where a court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction.187
2.

The Narrow Interpretation

Despite the broader interpretations of § 1631, other courts were not
willing to grant such an expansive role to § 1631. 188 The legislative
history of § 1631 specifically states that § 1631 “adds a new chapter to
title 28 that would authorize the court in which a case is improperly filed
to transfer it to a court where subject matter jurisdiction is proper.”189
whether venue could be changed upon finding the court lacked personal jurisdiction over a
defendant pursuant to § 1631. Id. at 317, 327–28.
184
Id. at 328.
Through § 1631, Congress “gave broad authority to permit the transfer
of an action between any two federal courts,” Ross, 822 F.2d at 1526,
and courts have effectuated Congress’s intent by broadly construing
the statute . . . . Moreover, a broad construction of the statute is
consistent with Congress’s intent to “protect a plaintiff against either
additional expense or the expiration of a relevant statute of limitations
in the event that the plaintiff makes an error in trying to select the
proper court within the complex federal court system.”
Id.
185
Id. (“The literal language of the statute . . . is broad enough to encompass either [lack
of subject matter or personal jurisdiction].” (citing Tayon, supra note 172, at 224)).
186
See supra Part II.C.1 (explaining the broad interpretation of § 1631 where courts utilize
it to transfer a case when a court lacks personal jurisdiction).
187
See infra Part II.C.2 (describing the narrow interpretation of § 1631).
188
See Pedzewick v. Foe, 963 F. Supp. 48 (D. Mass. 1997); Levy v. Pyramid Co., 687 F.
Supp. 48 (N.D.N.Y. 1988); see also Mortensen v. Wheel Horse Prods. Inc., 772 F. Supp. 85
(N.D.N.Y. 1994); McTyre v. Broward Gen. Med. Ctr., 749 F. Supp. 102 (D.N.J. 1990).
189
S. REP. NO. 97-180, at 30 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1, 40. Specifically the
legislative history follows:
Because of the complexity of the Federal court system and of special
jurisdictional provisions, a civil case may on occasion be mistakenly
filed in a court—either trial or appellate—that does not have
jurisdiction. By the time the error is discovered, the statute of
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Other courts acknowledged this language and used it to assert that
§ 1631 could only be used in instances where a court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction.190
In Levy v. Pyramid Co.,191 a Second Circuit district court rejected the
idea that § 1631 applied to instances where the court lacked personal
jurisdiction over the defendant.192 The Levy court declined to use § 1631
because neither the legislative history of § 1631 nor a majority of cases
supported that idea.193 Despite the broad language of § 1631, the Levy
court found that it only applies when a court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction and not when a court lacks personal jurisdiction over the
defendant. 194 The Levy court even recognized Ross but specifically
decided not to follow that holding.195

limitations or a filing period may have expired. Moreover, additional
expense is occasioned by having to file the case anew in the proper
court.
Section 301 adds a new chapter to title 28 that would authorize
the court in which a case is improperly filed to transfer it to a court
where subject matter jurisdiction is proper. The case would be treated
by the transferee court as though it had been initially filed . . . in the
transferor court. The plaintiff will not have to pay any additional
filing fees. This provision is broadly drafted to allow transfer between
any two Federal courts. Although most problems of misfiling have
occurred in the district and circuit courts, others have occurred in the
Court of International Trade and the Temporary Emergency Court of
Appeals. The broadly drafted provisions of section 301 will help avoid
all of these situations.
Id. (emphasis added).
190
See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
191
687 F. Supp. 48. Although the Second Circuit has never specifically held whether
§ 1631 applies to both instances of personal and subject matter jurisdiction, it did
apparently give some indication of its inclinations on the issue in Songbyrd Inc. v. Grossman,
206 F.3d 172 (2d Cir. 2000). The Songbyrd court specifically stated in a footnote that “[t]he
Tenth Circuit has ruled that authority to transfer for lack of personal jurisdiction is
provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1631 . . . but the legislative history of section 1631 provides some
reason to believe that this section authorizes transfers only to cure lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.” Id. at 179 n.9.
192
687 F. Supp. at 51. The action arose when Sophie Levy filed a personal injury action in
New York. Id. at 50. The action was originally filed in the Maryland District Court, which
was found to not have jurisdiction over the defendant. Id. The action was transferred to
New York where, again, the statute of limitations had run and the defendant motioned to
dismiss the action. Id.
193
Id. at 51.
194
Id. (“Even though that statute can be interpreted to apply to cases such as the present
one where personal jurisdiction is lacking in the transferee court, the legislative history
does not support such an interpretation.”).
195
Id. at 51 n.3.
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Hence, the inconsistent applications of § 1631 cause venue
application to be an extremely muddled area of civil procedure, where
uncertain rules make venue transfer inefficient.196 The vague language
of the Goldlawr decision split courts on whether to transfer under
§1404(a) or § 1406(a) when a court lacked personal jurisdiction,197 which
in turn caused choice of law problems.198 Courts attempted to use § 1631
to alleviate these problems.199 However, the lack of uniformity in the
statute’s application resolves nothing, and furthermore, problems exist
with the language of the statute itself. 200 Part III addresses these
problems.201
III. SECTION 1631 MUST BE AMENDED TO MAKE VENUE TRANSFER EFFICIENT
The purpose of this Part is to prove that § 1631 needs to be amended
for three reasons. First, because different interpretations exist with the
application of § 1631, 202 the statute should be amended to achieve a
uniform application.203 Second, it should be amended to clearly establish
choice of law rules that courts should apply following a transfer under
§ 1631.204 Last, because the language of § 1631 indefinitely preserves a

The court recognizes that in Ross v. Colorado Outward Bound School, Inc.
. . . the court held that where the transferror [sic] court lacks personal
jurisdiction, the transfer should be made pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section
1631. In the court’s opinion, however, the Ross decision is untenable in
light of the explicit legislative history. Thus, the court declines to
follow the Tenth Circuit in that regard.
Id.
See infra Part III (discussing the problems with the inconsistent applications of § 1631).
See supra Parts II.B.1–3 (discussing the problems Goldlawr caused in the application of
§ 1404(a) and § 1406(a) when a court lacked personal jurisdiction).
198
See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing how courts split on which state law to apply following
a venue transfer when a court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant).
199
See infra Part III.B (exploring how § 1631 resolves some of the problems caused by
Goldlawr and its progeny).
200
See infra Part III.B.3 (determining the problems that exist with the language of the
statute itself).
201
See infra Part III (providing a detailed discussion of § 1631).
202
More than two interpretations exist, but this Note focuses on the interpretation that
§ 1631 overrules Goldlawr and its progeny and the starkest counterpart, that § 1631 is not
applicable, to illustrate the problem that inconsistent results have been reached because of
the vague language of the statute. See supra note 172 and accompanying text (looking at
some of the other interpretations of § 1631).
203
See supra Part II.C (describing both the narrow and broad interpretations of § 1631).
204
See supra Part II.C.2 (presenting the analysis and utilization of the narrow
interpretation of § 1631).
196
197
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plaintiff’s claim, it must be amended to eliminate this detriment to the
defendant.205
In order to understand the need for revising § 1631, one must first
understand the problems that Goldlawr caused that caused courts to use
§ 1631. Hence, Part III.A identifies § 1406(a) and Goldlawr as the root of
the venue transfer efficiency problem.206 Next, Part III.B discusses how
§ 1631 could have resolved these problems, why it fails, and therefore,
why it needs revision.207
A. The Root of the Problem
Congress and the courts have attempted to balance three goals with
venue transfer: convenience and fairness for defendants, preservation of
valid plaintiff claims, and efficiency.208 Courts first tried to hold this
balance with forum non conveniens, but due to its inefficiency, Congress
attempted to make venue transfer more efficient when it passed § 1404(a)
and, to some extent, § 1406(a). 209 However, courts were unsure of
See supra Part II.C.1 (presenting how the broad interpretations works).
See infra Part III.A.
207
See infra Part III.B (discussing the problems with § 1631).
208
See MOORE ET AL., supra note 1; supra note 35 and accompanying text (outlining the
balance of venue). Justice Frankfurter explained the balance between two extremes as
follows:
Two extremes are possible . . . (1) All venue may be determined solely
by rigid rules, which the defendant may invoke and which work for
convenience in the generality of cases. In such an extreme situation
there would be no means of responding to the special circumstances of
particular cases when the rigid venue rules are inappropriate. (2) At
the other extreme there may be no rigid venue provisions, but all
venue may be determined, upon the defendant’s objection to the
plaintiff’s choice of forum, by a finding of fact in each case of what is
the most convenient forum from the point of view of the parties and
the court. The element of undesirability in the second extreme is that it
involves too much preliminary litigation; it is desirable in that it makes
venue responsive to actual convenience.
The first extreme is
undesirable for according too little, in fact nothing, to actual
convenience when the case is a special one; it is desirable in that it does
away with preliminary litigation.
Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 367 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Thus, Justice
Frankfurter essentially suggests that the appropriate place to focus venue transfer is
somewhere between rigid rules focusing purely on efficiency and lenient rules focusing on
plaintiff or defendant rights. Id. Essentially, Justice Frankfurter’s balance seems similar to
finding the middle point among efficiency, plaintiff’s rights, and defendant’s rights, which
is the balance that this author suggests courts struggle to apply.
209
See supra Part II.A.2. More specifically, it respected plaintiffs’ rights when it allowed
transfer without having to re-file, preserved the law of plaintiffs’ choice of forum after Van
Dusen, applied uniformly to respect efficiency, and protected defendants’ rights much like
205
206

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol40/iss3/9

Butler: Venue Transfer When a Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction: Where a

2006]

Where are Courts Going with § 1631

829

§ 1406(a)’s limits or its purpose, even though courts knew it applied
when venue was improper. 210 The main reason for this confusion is
likely the lack of legislative history regarding the purpose of § 1406(a). 211
Another cause for this confusion was the codification of forum non
conveniens in § 1404(a).212 Whatever the reason, the root of the problem is
with the enigmatic § 1406(a) and the case that defined its purpose,
Goldlawr.213
The Goldlawr Court defined the purpose of § 1406(a) with vague
language, which in turn resulted in later courts interpreting Goldlawr as
setting out a new purpose for all venue transfers.214 The new purpose
was to remove any obstacle that prevented a plaintiff’s claim from
expeditious and orderly adjudication. 215 Goldlawr could be read as a
limited decision only outlining the purpose of § 1406(a) and only
pertaining to cases in which venue was improper. 216 However, later
courts determined that the lack of personal jurisdiction over the
defendant was the obstacle that Goldlawr was referring to with its vague
language. 217 As a result, the vague purpose that Goldlawr asserted
allowed other courts to determine that § 1404(a) and § 1406(a) performed
forum non convienens by granting them the ability to transfer a case if a plaintiff was trying
to claim an inconvenient forum. Id.
210
See supra notes 77–83 and accompanying text. Section 1406(a) makes no mention of
the law to be applied once transfer has occurred. Moreover, the statute does not detail the
precise jurisdictional requirements of either the transferee or transferor courts.
211
See supra notes 77–83 (pointing out that the legislative history of § 1406 provides no
purpose for the statute).
212
See supra notes 50, 52–58 (stating that § 1404(a) appeared to be a codification of forum
non conveniens).
213
See MOORE ET AL., supra note 1, § 111.02. “The difficulty that the courts have had in
determining which transfer statute to apply stems from a confusion regarding the
relationship between venue and personal jurisdiction resulting from the Supreme Court’s
decision in Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman.” Id.
214
See supra note 94 and accompanying text. The Court specifically mentioned § 1406(a)
in one sentence: “The language of § 1406(a) is amply broad enough to authorize the
transfer of cases, however wrong the plaintiff may have been in filing his case.” See supra
note 94 and accompanying text. However, the next sentence says nothing of any statute,
either § 1404(a) or § 1406(a), and instead simply asserts a purpose of procedure, which is
the sentence all courts relied upon following Goldlawr. See supra note 94 and accompanying
text; see also Martin v. Stokes, 623 F.2d 469 (6th Cir. 1980); Corke v. Sameiet M.S. Song, 572
F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1978); Mayo Clinic v. Kaiser, 383 F.2d 653 (8th Cir. 1967); Dubin v. United
States, 380 F.2d 813 (5th Cir. 1967).
215
See supra note 94 and accompanying text (stating the language that was the basis for
this idea).
216
See supra note 94 and accompanying text (specifically mentioning only § 1406(a) and
not § 1404(a)).
217
See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing that the Goldlawr decision only mentions § 1406(a) and
never mentions § 1404(a)); see also Goldlawr v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 466 (1962).
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the same function when a court lacks personal jurisdiction over the
defendant.218 The ensuing disagreement among courts over whether to
use § 1404(a) or § 1406(a) to transfer a case when a court lacked personal
jurisdiction over the defendant created inefficiency because there were
differences in which state’s law applied following each respective
transfer provision.219
Sections 1404(a) and 1406(a) used varying language and functioned
differently, 220 but they were functioning equivalently when a court
transferred a case in which it lacked personal jurisdiction over the
defendant.221 Congress passed two distinct statutes, and it is illogical for
them to function identically; yet, the circuits have remained divided on
which transfer provision applies when a court lacks personal jurisdiction
over the defendant.222 The decision between whether to use § 1404(a) or
§ 1406(a) is crucial because each statute dictates a specific state’s law to
apply after the transfer. 223 Hence, § 1404(a) and § 1406(a) should
function differently because they have different consequences. 224
However, because § 1404(a) and § 1406(a) were functioning similarly, the
consequences that followed these statutes after Goldlawr resulted in

See Finzi, supra note 6, at 986–87. Goldlawr did not specify whether the lack of
jurisdiction or lack of venue was the basis for allowing the transfer; hence, courts faced a
dilemma when they heard cases where venue was proper but they lacked jurisdiction
because Goldlawr did not provide the answer. Id. As stated, being faithful to the language
of the statutes and established principles placed a more incompetent plaintiff in a better
position than a less incompetent plaintiff, and courts were simply not willing to allow this
inequity to happen. Id. Hence, courts searched for various approaches to extend Goldlawr
to this situation to alleviate this injustice, like the Berkowitz court did in applying Goldlawr
to §1404(a). Id. What all these courts failed to recognize is that while they alleviated one
injustice, they were creating another injustice by cutting into efficiency by deviating from
concrete rules.
219
See supra note 94 and accompanying text (setting forth the language used in Goldlawr);
see also Part II.B.2 and accompanying notes (stating how courts applied § 1404(a) and
§ 1406(a)).
220
See supra notes 51, 69 and accompanying text (providing the specific language of each
statute).
221
See supra Part II.B.2 (explaining how courts used both § 1404(a) and § 1406(a) to
transfer a case when a court lacked jurisdiction but venue was proper).
222
See supra Part II.B.2.
223
See supra Parts II.A.2–3 (explaining that under § 1404(a) courts generally apply the
state law of the transferor court, while under § 1406(a) courts generally apply the state law
of the transferee court); see also Part II.B.3 (explaining how complicated and inconsistent
courts were in determining which state law followed a transfer under either § 1404(a) or
§ 1406(a) when those provisions were used to transfer a case when venue was proper but a
court lacked personal jurisdiction).
224
See supra Part II.A (explaining the general function of both § 1404(a) and § 1406(a) in
how they are used and the choice of law that follows each in a transfer).
218
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choice of law issues that made venue transfer unworkable.225 Therefore,
courts used § 1631 in an attempt to remedy the problems that Goldlawr
and its progeny caused.226
B. Section 1631: The Near Remedy of Goldlawr and Its Problems
Section 1631 almost remedied the problems that Goldlawr and its
progeny caused.227 Goldlawr did not take into account that courts would
use § 1404(a) and § 1406(a) for venue transfer when they lacked personal
jurisdiction over the defendant.228 Furthermore, Goldlawr did not predict
the effect its decision would have upon choice of law following venue
transfer. 229 With § 1631, whether it used § 1404(a) or § 1406(a) in a
transfer in which a court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant
was irrelevant because § 1631 would supercede the application of both
§ 1404(a) and § 1406(a).230 Thus, § 1631 abolished the question of which
venue transfer provision to use.
Section 1631 also cleared up some of the choice of law problems;
specifically, it dealt with the statute of limitations problem.231 Courts
were unsure whether to use Goldlawr to deviate from established choice
of law rules with § 1404(a) and § 1406(a), or more specifically, courts
See Bayles, supra note 91, at 640 (“If courts were to decide each case afresh without
regard to precedent, they might reach opposite conclusions in relevantly similar cases.”).
Such a result would undermine certainty and efficiency. See Paul E. Loving, The Justice of
Certainty, 73 OR. L. REV. 743, 746 (1994) (“Certainty achieves fairness to those who rely upon
the law, efficiency in following precedent, continuity and equality in treating similar cases
equally.” (quoting McGregor Co. v. Heritage, 631 P.2d 1355, 1366 (Or. 1981))).
226
See supra Part II.C.1 (explaining how the Ross court used § 1631 to alleviate the
inefficient venue transfer system).
227
Justice Harlan suggested from the start that the problem encountered in Goldlawr was
a problem best left to Congress, and ironically, the Ross court may have recognized Justice
Harlan’s idea when it determined that § 1631 would be the dominating transfer statute
when personal jurisdiction was lacking. See Goldlawr v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 468 (1962)
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (“In these circumstances I think the matter is better left for further
action by Congress.”).
228
See supra Part II.B (discussing how several courts varied in whether to use § 1404(a) or
§ 1406(a) in a transfer when the court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant when
venue was proper).
229
See supra Part II.B.1 (covering the Goldlawr opinion).
230
See supra Part II.C.1 (presenting the Ross court’s analysis of the application of § 1631
and explaining that it supercedes § 1404(a) and § 1406(a) in transfers when a court lacks
personal jurisdiction); see also Oakley, supra note 173, at 981 (“If section 1631 permits
transfer to cure a lack of personal jurisdiction, it moots the need for a strained construction
of either section 1404 or section 1406 to permit such a transfer in ‘the interests of justice.’”).
231
See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the split in whether to apply Goldlawr to overcome
choice of law problems that would result in dismissal and hence be an obstruction to
efficient adjudication).
225
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were unsure whether to apply the statute of limitations of the transferee
state or transferor state.232 Section 1631 rendered this question irrelevant
because the language of § 1631 assumed the action in the transferee
forum was technically filed on the day it was initiated in the transferor
forum. 233 Hence, the concern of the Mayo Clinic court, in which a
plaintiff’s claim could be barred by the transferee statute of limitations if
the transferee law applied, evaporated.234
Finally, § 1631 allowed § 1404(a) and § 1406(a) to operate in the
capacity that they did before Goldlawr, which reinforced certain, uniform
venue transfer rules. 235 Because § 1631 applied when a court lacked
personal jurisdiction, § 1406(a) would apply only when venue was
improper and § 1404(a) would apply only when venue was proper.236
Further, each venue transfer provision would suggest that certain state
law be applied following the respective transfer of each transfer
provision.237 Despite these remedies, § 1631 has three major problems:
(1) inconsistent applications of the statute, (2) a lack of clarity regarding
choice of law following transfer, and (3) inherently unfair application
toward defendants.238

232
See supra Parts II.B.2–3 (discussing the choice of law problems that resulted from the
analysis of Goldlawr).
233
See supra Part II.C.1 (discussing the Ross court’s application of § 1631 and that the
transferee forum had to assume the action was filed there the same day it was filed in the
transferor forum).
234
See supra notes 140–49 and accompanying text (discussing the concern of the Mayo
Clinic court).
235
Loving, supra note 225, at 763–64.
Justice Peterson’s certain rule is a just rule because certainty enables an
individual to conform his or her conduct to the law . . . . This promotes
business innovation and development by letting firms know what they
can and cannot do. Further, by eliminating speculation as to what the
law is and avoiding a need for interpretation, clarification, or
explanation, certainty promotes efficiency for businesses and
individuals . . . . The certain rule allows an individual to contemplate
his or her actions based on an understanding that he or she knows will
not change when he or she reaches the courtroom doors.
Id.
236
See supra Part III.B.1 (identifying the problem where courts split on using § 1404(a)
and § 1406(a) in applying transfers when a court lacks personal jurisdiction).
237
See supra Parts II.A.2–3 (explaining how § 1404(a) and § 1406(a) function and that
different choice of law follows a venue transfer under each provision).
238
See infra Parts III.B.1–3 (discussing the problems with § 1631 in detail).
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Problem One: Inconsistent Results of § 1631

The first problem with § 1631 is that courts currently disagree over
whether § 1631 even applies when courts lack personal jurisdiction
because the legislative history specifically mentions “subject-matter
jurisdiction” while the statute mentions only “jurisdiction.” 239 Thus,
currently there is no uniformity in the application of § 1631 or certainty
in how to interpret § 1631.240 If § 1631 cannot be used to transfer a case
when a court lacks personal jurisdiction, the only process left to use is
the old inefficient system stemming from Goldlawr, which utilizes both
§ 1404(a) and § 1406(a). 241 Moreover, because courts cannot agree on
§ 1631’s application, matters are confused further because courts must
also consider whether to use § 1631 on top of the analysis of Goldlawr and
its progeny. 242
The district courts that do not apply § 1631 convincingly argue that
§ 1631 only applies to instances of subject matter jurisdiction. 243 The
legislative history of § 1631 only mentions subject matter jurisdiction,
and these courts cannot be criticized for utilizing legislative history as a
tool for determining the function of § 1631 because legislative history is a
major tool courts use when analyzing the function of statutes.244 Even
though no court has applied the old analysis under Goldlawr, this narrow

239
See infra Part II.C; see also Oakley, supra note 173, at 979 (“Rather than constituting a
simple binary circuit split, the cases construing section 1631 can best be described as
encompassing a range of gradations.”).
240
See supra note 91 and accompanying text (explaining why lack of certainty and
uniformity erode efficiency).
241
See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the inefficiency that resulted when courts were unsure
of whether to extend Goldlawr past choice of law protections).
242
See Bayles, supra note 91, at 639 (“When cases at the trial level clearly fall within the
boundaries of a precedent, it saves time and money for all involved to follow precedent.”).
Unless the Courts establish and maintain certainty and stability in the
law, businessmen cannot safely and wisely make contracts with their
employees or with each other; the meaning of wills, bonds, contracts,
deeds, and leases will fluctuate and change with each change in the
personnel or in the changing views of a Court; property interests will
be jeopardized and frequently lost or changed; Government cannot
adequately protect law-abiding persons or communities against
criminals; private citizens will not know their rights and obligations;
and public officials will not know from week to week or month to
month the powers and limitations of government.
Id. at 637–38 (quoting Chief Justice Bell of Pennsylvania).
243
See supra Part II.C.2 (explaining that the courts that do not follow § 1631 do so because
the legislative history of § 1631 only mentions that a case may be transferred when it lacks
subject matter jurisdiction).
244
See supra note 189 and accompanying text (providing the legislative history of § 1631).
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interpretation of § 1631 means that the old case law and process still
exist, which reveals that venue transfer problems remain unresolved.245
Therefore, once again, efficiency is undermined due to uncertainty and
lack of uniformity in venue transfer application.246
2.

Problem Two: Section 1631 Does Not Specify Which Choice of Law
to Apply

The second problem is that the statute itself does not specify which
state’s law applies following a venue transfer.247 The language of the
statute provides that the case should be treated as if it were originally
filed in the transferee court, but there is no specific language that
suggests that the law of the transferee court should apply.248 Hence, the
opportunity exists for varied interpretation due to the lack of specificity
in the statute. This problem should be corrected to establish a clear rule,
allowing courts to determine, and attorneys to expect, which law will
apply following a venue transfer. 249
3.

Problem Three:
Defendants

The Language of § 1631 is too Detrimental to

The third problem is that § 1631 allows a plaintiff to manipulate the
system, which is unfair to defendants. 250 Section 1631 overrides the
choice of law protections that courts like the Nelson court tried to extend
to avoid plaintiff forum shopping.251 From the plaintiff’s perspective,
courts throwing out valid claims through bars such as personal
jurisdiction and the statute of limitations are legitimate concerns. 252
See supra Part III.A (discussing the problems Goldlawr caused).
See supra note 91 and accompanying text (indicating why lack of uniformity results in
inefficiency).
247
See supra note 173 and accompanying text (providing the exact text of § 1631).
248
See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
249
See supra Part II.B.3 (indicating the difficulty courts have when it is unclear which
choice of law to apply following a venue transfer).
250
See supra Part II.C (discussing the specific application of § 1631). It should be noted
that this Note focuses on the application of choice of law between competing states based
on transfers from diversity jurisdiction. A completely separate issue is a transfer pursuant
to § 1404(a) or § 1406(a) based on a federal question. For an application of choice of law
and venue transfer pursuant to federal question issues, see MOORE ET AL., supra note 1,
§ 111.20(2). While application of § 1631 to instances of federal question cases would further
promote efficiency, the analysis of that situation is simply too large of an issue and is
beyond the scope of this Note.
251
See supra notes 163–67 and accompanying text (discussing the Nelson court opinion
and concerns).
252
See supra notes 94–99 and accompanying text (showing the concerns for plaintiff
claims by the Goldlawr Court). This was the concern the Goldlawr Court was worried about
245
246
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However, plaintiffs and courts like Goldlawr fail to notice that these
“elusive facts” exist to protect defendants.253
Even though Congress eliminated the harsh results of dismissal with
forum non conveniens by passing § 1404(a),254 the Goldlawr court wrongly
interpreted § 1406(a) as a device that trumped the requirement that a
court dismiss a case for lack of personal jurisdiction over the
defendant. 255 With forum non conveniens, the forum is valid and the
problem is that mere inconvenience warrants a dismissal.256 Congress
deemed this to be a harsh result and passed § 1404(a) and § 1406(a) to
remedy such situations with forum non conveniens. 257 However, with
personal jurisdiction, dismissal is justified because the court has no
power over the defendant. 258 The Goldlawr court failed to state the
reason for dismissal when a court lacks personal jurisdiction over the
defendant, which is to protect the defendant.259 The Court justified its

when a plaintiff’s claim could be dismissed because of an erroneous guess to an elusive fact
such as jurisdiction, but what the Court failed to notice is that this “elusive fact” was there
for a reason: to protect defendants. See supra notes 94–99 and accompanying text; see also
supra notes 138–47 and accompanying text (discussing the Mayo Clinic analysis with choice
of law). The Mayo Clinic court took these worries even further past the statute of
limitations. See supra notes 138–47 and accompanying text. Other arguments that plaintiffs
worry about is that they may be lulled into a false sense of security by negotiations with
defendants that may cause a plaintiff to refrain from bringing a claim, which warrants the
result of Goldlawr. See Froelich v. Petrelli, 472 F. Supp. 756, 761 (D. Haw. 1979). A court
should only utilize such estoppel when the defendant, by words, acts, and conduct, led the
plaintiff to believe it would pay the claim and then breaks off negotiations when the time
for the suit has passed. See Bomba v. W.L. Belvidere, Inc., 579 F.2d 1067, 1071 (7th Cir.
1978).
253
See supra note 87 and accompanying text (describing personal jurisdiction generally
and the protections it offers to defendants); see also Page, supra note 35, at 1158–60
(describing personal jurisdiction as a guarantee that defendants receive treatment in a
manner consistent with the Due Process Clause).
254
See supra notes 52–59 and accompanying text (discussing why Congress passed
§ 1404(a)).
255
See supra Part II.B.1 (observing the Goldlawr opinion).
256
See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the function of forum non convienens).
257
See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing forum non convienens, how it operated, and why
§ 1404(a) was passed to supercede its general operation among federal courts).
258
See supra note 87 and accompanying text (discussing personal jurisdiction and why it
is a protection for defendants and normally warrants dismissal).
259
Clearly the lower court’s analysis was much more sound:
Section 1406(a) provides for the transfer of cases when venue is
improper. It does not mention jurisdictional defects. Whatever be the
desirability of a rule that a district court may transfer a case when
venue is mislaid and jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is
lacking, it is an unwarranted exercise of judicial interpretation to find
that a statute, expressly providing for transfer to cure a venue defect,
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decision by stating that it was more efficient to preserve a plaintiff’s
claim rather than dismiss a case.260 Hence, after Goldlawr, some courts
determined that a plaintiff’s claim should be preserved indefinitely,
which is simply taking venue transfer too far.
The broad interpretation of § 1631 essentially codifies this
interpretation because it first allows a transfer and then considers the
action filed in the transferee court on the day it was originally filed in the
transferor court.261 Thus, with the broad interpretation of § 1631, if the
statute of limitations had run after the action was filed in the improper
court, it would not matter, and defendants essentially lose the protection
of the statute of limitations.262 This interpretation removes too many
protections for defendants.263
Despite the fact that plaintiffs may lose valid claims when a case is
dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction or choice of law concerns, allowing
a plaintiff’s claim to inevitably be preserved removes protections that
defendants rely on and undermines the adversarial system.264 Further, it
impliedly provides for a transfer to cure a more basic jurisdictional
defect. The lesser does not by implication include the greater.
Goldlawr v. Heiman, 288 F.2d 579, 582 (2d Cir. 1961), rev’d 369 U.S. 463 (1962) (emphasis
added). Also, the Goldlawr dissent, written by Justice Harlan, probably best describes the
problem with Goldlawr. 369 U.S. 463, 467–68 (1962) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan
argued:
The notion that a District Court may deal with an in personam action in
such a way as possibly to affect a defendant’s substantive rights
without first acquiring jurisdiction over him is not a familiar one in
federal jurisprudence. No one suggests that Congress was aware that
28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) might be so used when it enacted that statute. The
“interest of justice” of which the statute speaks and which the Court’s
opinion emphasizes in support of its construction of § 1406(a) is
assuredly not a one-way street.
Id.
260
See supra note 94 and accompanying text (setting out the language in Goldlawr that
creates this problem).
261
See Part II.C.1; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1631 (2000) (“[T]he action or appeal shall proceed as
if it had been filed in or noticed for the court to which it is transferred on the date upon
which it was actually filed in or noticed for the court from which it is transferred.”).
262
See supra Part II.C.1 (discussing the broad interpretation).
263
See supra Part III.B.3 (discussing the competing concerns between courts on whether to
extend protection to plaintiffs or defendants).
264
See Richardson, supra note 141, at 1021 (“Statutes of limitations, it has been said, ‘are
designed to prevent unreasonable delay in the enforcement of legal rights.’ . . . This
viewpoint specifically acknowledges that plaintiffs should be permitted to enforce their
rights, provided that they do so without unreasonable delay.”). Allowing plaintiffs to have
their claims preserved over defects in personal jurisdiction and the statutes of limitations
drastically decreases the diligence a plaintiff is expected to practice when filing a claim. Id.;
see also supra note 74 (discussing the problems and concerns with forum shopping).
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encourages plaintiffs to forum shop because their claims are preserved
indefinitely.265 Both the Ellis and Nelson courts determined that it was
unfair for a plaintiff to circumvent the statute of limitations through
venue transfer when jurisdiction was improper.266 If a plaintiff’s claim
was preserved indefinitely, a plaintiff would have no reason to practice
diligence when he knows that his claim will always be preserved, and he
could forum shop to capture the law he wanted.267 Courts like Nelson
and Ellis recognized this problem and were unwilling to make the
adversary system so lopsided. 268 Therefore, at least in some circuits,
indefinite preservation of a plaintiff’s claim was stopped before courts
even used § 1631.269 The problem is that the inherent language of § 1631
essentially codifies the principle that plaintiff claims will be preserved
indefinitely.
However, the counterargument to this analysis is that if a defendant
has already prepared to adjudicate a claim, the claim is not “stale,” and
the protection of the statute of limitations is irrelevant.270 Yet, allowing
plaintiffs to circumvent the statute of limitations promotes forum
shopping and undermines the adversarial system because a plaintiff can
also capture more favorable choice of law benefits besides the statute of
limitations. 271 Further, it remains much easier and more certain to
dismiss a claim that fails to meet the statute of limitations than it is to
265
See supra notes 140–49 and accompanying text (discussing the Mayo Clinic case where
analysis was set forth that essentially preserved a plaintiff’s claim indefinitely).
266
See supra notes 150–67 and accompanying text (discussing the opinions of the Ellis and
Nelson courts).
267
See supra note 264 and accompanying text (discussing why plaintiffs would need to
file less diligently).
268
See supra notes 150–67 and accompanying text (providing that both the Ellis and
Nelson courts stated that it would be unfair to allow plaintiffs to capture choice of law and
forum shop by applying the transferor court law based on a transfer when a court lacked
jurisdiction over the defendant).
269
See supra notes 150–67 and accompanying text.
270
See Richardson, supra note 141, at 1020. Mr. Richardson states:
[T]he objective of limitations law is to protect defendants from the
difficulty of defending against “stale,” i.e., old, claims. Such protection
is generally viewed as a simple matter of fairness to defendants. . . .
Some cases have stated that the statutes of limitations are intended to
protect would be “defendants from stale claims brought after
memories have faded” or evidence and witnesses have been lost . . . .
According to other cases, statutes are enacted to “encourage the
prompt presentation of claims to assure fairness to defendants.”
Id. However, it is difficult to say that a claim has “faded” after the defendants have already
prepared to litigate.
271
See supra note 74 and accompanying text (discussing forum shopping); see also supra
note 263 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of diligence problem).
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create exceptions “in the interests of justice” to preserve a plaintiff’s
claim following transfer. 272 By once again looking to the purpose of
venue transfer, which is efficiency, § 1631 should be amended to err on
the more certain and efficient result of not circumventing the statute of
limitations.273
In conclusion, although § 1631 sought to resolve the Goldlawr
problems, the statute must be revised to operate effectively.274 First, the
current inconsistencies with § 1631 do not allow it to resolve the
problems Goldlawr and its progeny caused in venue transfers when a
court lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant.275 Second, § 1631 is
not specific enough in stating which law will apply following a transfer,
and this uncertainty may lead to discrepancies among courts in the
future. 276 Third, allowing transfers by a court that lacks personal
jurisdiction over a defendant permits courts to remove additional
defendant protections in order to preserve a plaintiff’s claim. 277 The
language of § 1631 essentially codifies this problem.278
Clearly, the purpose of venue transfer has come a long way since
forum non convienens.279 Section 1631 has the potential to fix the Goldlawr
problems, but it must be amended to (1) resolve the discrepancy on
whether § 1631 should be used, (2) specify which choice of law is to
apply, and (3) better protect defendants.280

272
See supra note 173 and accompanying text (providing the language of § 1631, which
includes the words “in the interest of justice”).
273
See supra notes 235, 242 and accompanying text (discussing how certain and uniform
rules promote efficiency); see also supra note 35 and accompanying text (discussing the
purpose of venue transfer and generally promoting efficiency).
274
See supra Parts III.A–B.
Although the ultimate application of the appropriate statute of
limitations is a comparatively simple business, the intermediate
inquiry of which state’s statute of limitations should be applied leads
us on a merry chase through the murky area in which the Erie doctrine
and the federal change of venue statutes intersect.
Ellis v. Great Sw. Corp., 646 F.2d 1099, 1100–01 (5th Cir. 1981).
275
See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing this particular problem with § 1631).
276
See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing the second problem with the application of § 1631).
277
See supra Part III.B.3 (discussing the third problem with the application of § 1631).
278
See supra note 173 (providing the language of § 1631).
279
See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the purpose of forum non conveniens).
280
See infra Part IV (providing the reasoning for the amendments as well as the
amendments to § 1631 themselves).
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IV. CONTRIBUTION
Venue transfer has clearly lost its focus of promoting efficient
transfer of claims. Courts took the appropriate action by using § 1631 to
provide a clear standard for transfer when a court lacks jurisdiction, but
because courts are unclear regarding whether it applies and the statute
takes too much away from defendants, the statute must be amended.
This Note proposes that several amendments be made to § 1631. First,
§ 1631 must be amended to clearly indicate that it is the applicable
statute to be used for venue transfer when a court lacks personal
jurisdiction over the defendant. Second, § 1631 must be amended to
specifically outline the choice of law following a § 1631 transfer. Last,
§ 1631 must be amended so as not to allow plaintiffs to manipulate the
venue transfer system. Thus, Congress should amend § 1631 as follows
and label it subsection (a):
(a) Whenever a district court in which a case is filed a civil
action is filed in a court as defined in section 610 of this
title or an appeal, including a petition for review of
administrative action, is noticed for or filed with such a
court and that court finds that there is a want of subject
matter or personal jurisdiction, whether venue is proper or
improper, the court shall, if it is in the interest of justice,
transfer such action or appeal to any other such court in
which the action or appeal could have been brought at
the time it was filed or noticed, and the court to which it is
transferred shall apply the substantive law of the state in
which it sits to the action or appeal as if it were filed the day of
transfer to such a court and the action or appeal shall
proceed as if it had been filed in or noticed for the court
to which it is transferred on the date upon which it was
actually filed in or noticed for the court from which it is
transferred.281
Commentary
The amended § 1631 makes the necessary changes to (1) create three
separate venue provisions that do not appear to function the same way,
(2) specifically define which choice of law to apply following a transfer,

281
28 U.S.C. § 1631. The normal font is the language of the original statute. The text that
appears in italics is the proposed language the author wishes to add, and the language with
a line through it is the language the author wishes to strike from the original statute.
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and (3) protect defendant rights by setting a limit of how far a court must
go to preserve a plaintiff’s claim.
First, this change will improve the efficiency of venue transfer
because courts will have three separate venue transfer provisions to use
in distinct situations. The change in the language from stating
“jurisdiction” to “want of subject-matter or personal jurisdiction” clears
up any discrepancies as to when the statute should be used and thus
resolves the inconsistencies in dealing with § 1631.282 This change will
provide courts with three separate venue transfer provisions to use in
distinct situations, and it will clear up the blurred purpose of venue
transfer created by Goldlawr.283 The effect of this change on § 1404(a) and
§ 1406(a) would be beneficial because they will each function distinctly.
Section 1404(a) will be used when venue is proper but a more convenient
forum exists for the litigation to take place.284 Section 1406(a) will be
used only when venue is improper and justice demands a transfer take
place, and § 1631 will be used when either subject matter or personal
jurisdiction is lacking, regardless of whether venue is proper.285 All three
statutes retain the discretionary language “in the interest of justice” to
allow courts to dismiss the action if they determine that justice demands
it.286 The problem of Goldlawr and its progeny, where it made § 1404(a)
See supra Part III.C.
See supra Part III.B.1.
284
See Oakley, supra note 173, at 972, for a similar reasoning by proposing a change to
§ 1404(a).
This prospectus recommends curing the problem of overlap by
revising subsection 1404(a) to make clear that it authorizes transfer
only when dictated by convenience interests, not the need to save the
plaintiff from the prejudicial consequences of having brought suit in a
court without proper subject-matter jurisdiction, venue, or personal
jurisdiction over the defendant.
Id.
285
Id. Professor Oakley provides a different approach to fixing the Goldlawr problems.
“Section 1631 . . . should be revised to make clear that it is the vehicle for transfer to cure a
lack of subject—matter jurisdiction. Section 1406 should be broadened to make express
what some courts have implied: that it permits transfer for lack of personal jurisdiction as
well as improper venue.” Id. The only problem with this amendment to § 1406(a) and
§ 1631 is that § 1406(a) does not take into account choice of law following a transfer, and
thus the problem identified in Part III.B.2 would not be resolved. Hence, the author’s
proposed amendment to § 1631 widens the application of § 1631 to both subject matter and
personal jurisdiction, allows the choice of law clause included in the statute to apply to
both instances, and clears up the problem with choice of law created by Goldlawr because
courts know they have to apply the transferee court law as ordered by Congress.
286
See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (“For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interests
of justice, a district court may transfer.”); 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (“The district court of a district
in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it
be in the interest of justice, transfer such case.”).
282
283
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and § 1406(a) function equivalently, is resolved.287 Therefore, thinking
back to our friend Kate, because the court lacked personal jurisdiction
over Kate’s client, there should be no discrepancy in which venue
transfer provision to use, and the applicable statute would clearly be
§ 1631.288
Second, the amended changes will make all cases that applied the
Goldlawr analysis in either choice of law or venue transfer obsolete,
including Goldlawr itself, because the new § 1631 tells courts which law
to apply.289 Hence, the original purpose of venue transfer, the promotion
of efficiency, is reinstated, and any claim that involves issues like that
between Kate and Sally would use § 1631 if the court lacked jurisdiction,
§ 1406(a) if the court was an improper venue, and § 1404(a) if the original
venue was proper but inconvenient.290
Third, this change still respects the preservation of plaintiffs’ claims
because a plaintiff is permitted to make a transfer even when the court
lacks jurisdiction over the defendant. 291 Hence, the concern of the
Goldlawr court that such dismissals are inefficient or unfair is
preserved. 292 However, the amended § 1631 also protects defendant
rights by not allowing circumvention of all actions that would result in
dismissal. 293 The change in the language at the end of the statute
requires that the transferee court apply the state law where it sits upon
the day it arrives. The amended § 1631 removes the original language
that allows the action to commence in the transferee court as if it were
filed on the day it was filed in the transferor court. The amendment
essentially codifies the decision of the Nelson court. 294 This change
allows the statute of limitations in the transferee forum to continue
running even after the plaintiff has filed his claim in the improper forum.
Plaintiffs will no longer be able to gamble at acquiring beneficial law
because their claims will not necessarily be preserved indefinitely. Most
importantly, this change reinstates important defendant rights contained
in choice of law analysis such as the statute of limitations. A claim like
See supra Part III.B.1.
See supra Part I.
289
See supra Part III.B.2.
290
See supra Part I.
291
See supra Part III.B.3.
292
See supra Part II.B.1.
293
See supra Part III.B.3.
294
See Nelson v. Int’l Paint Co., 716 F.2d 640, 643 (9th Cir. 1983) (“[I]t is necessary to look
to the law of the transferee state, also to prevent forum shopping, and to deny plaintiffs
choice-of-law advantages to which they would not have been entitled in the proper
forum.”).
287
288
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Sally’s would be barred, and Kate’s client would not have to worry about
losing the protection of the Iowa statute of limitations.295 Hence, the
amended § 1631 respects the balance between plaintiff and defendant
rights.
Further, in order to avoid any confusion on the definition of “district
court,” the following language should be added as subsection (b) to
§ 1631:
(b) As used in this section, the term “district court”
includes the District Court of Guam, the District Court
for the Northern Mariana Islands, and the District Court
of the Virgin Islands, and the term “district” includes the
territorial jurisdiction of each such court.296
Commentary
This proposed section simply transports the language used in both
§ 1404(a) and § 1406(a) into § 1631. 297 Hence, the use of identical
language in all three statutes will solidify them as companion sections to
be applied to transfer cases. Further, it will promote uniformity and
See supra Part I.
This subsection is the verbatim language used in both § 1404(d) and § 1406(c). See
supra notes 52, 69 and accompanying text. It appears nowhere in the original text of the
statute, nor does the original statute contain a subsection (b). Adding this subsection clears
up exactly what courts should use the new § 1631(a) when making a transfer, and it is
meant to clear up the language from the beginning of the old § 1631, which stated:
“Whenever a civil action is filed in a court as defined in section 610 of this title.” See supra
note 173 and accompanying text (emphasis added). The change is meant to alleviate the
concern raised by Mr. Tayon, that “[t]his definition of ‘courts’ excludes certain courts.
Therefore, the express legislative intent to provide a provision which ‘is broadly drafted to
permit transfer between any two federal courts’ has not been realized.” See Tayon, supra
note 173, at 225. Mr. Tayon’s amendment, which differs, reads as follows:
(b) The term “court” as employed by this provision shall include any
state or federal administrative, legislative or judicial tribunal.
Id. at 231.
297
See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(d).
As used in this section, the term “district court” includes the District of
Guam, the District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands, and the
District Court of the Virgin Islands, and the term “district” includes
the territorial jurisdiction of each such court.
Id.
As used in this section, the term “district court” includes the District of
Guam, the District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands, and the
District Court of the Virgin Islands, and the term “district” includes
the territorial jurisdiction of each such court.
28 U.S.C. § 1406(c).
295
296
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certainty by outlining that all district courts can use the new § 1631
transfer statute to transfer a case when a court lacks jurisdiction, just like
all courts can use § 1404(a) and § 1406(a) to transfer a case when venue is
proper or improper.298
V. CONCLUSION: A BRICK IN THE WALL
Kate would have much less of a headache if § 1631 were amended in
a way that properly balanced the plaintiff’s choice of forum, defendant
protections, and efficiency. Not all problems with venue transfer
efficiency would be resolved, but at least the problems caused by
Goldlawr and its progeny would disappear. With courts unsure of
whether to use § 1404(a) or § 1406(a) and which choice of law to apply, it
is no wonder that Kate’s lawsuit became so confusing before even
reaching the merits.
Further, the varied application of § 1631
undermined Sally’s attempt to resolve the lawsuit. The proposed
amendment to § 1631 would make Kate and Sally’s action proceed in a
more efficient fashion, as Kate would expect, because the court would
have to transfer under § 1631. Furthermore, Kate would not have to
worry about venue transfer being so unfair because the statute of
limitations could no longer be circumvented. Essentially, both Sally and
Kate could predict the court’s decision and whether the action could
continue. Amending § 1631 would be one small step in making venue
transfer more efficient, but at least every Sally and every Kate would
know where courts were going with 28 U.S.C. § 1631.
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